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Software plays an increasingly important role in modern safety-critical systems. 
Reliable software becomes desirable for all stakeholders. Typical software related 
failures include software internal failures, input failures, output failures, support 
failures and multiple interaction failures. This dissertation provides a methodology to 
study the impact of hardware support failures on software reliability.  
The hardware failures we are focusing on in this study are semiconductor device 
intrinsic failures that are directly related to software execution during device 
operation. The software execution on hardware devices, in essence, is a series of 0 
and 1 signal alternations for the inputs of hardware components. Such signal 
alternations lead to voltage changes and current flows in the microelectronic 
hardware device, which serve as electrical stresses on the device and may lead to 
physical failures. The failure mechanisms include Hot Carrier Injection (HCI), 
Electromigration (EM), and Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB). During 
  
device operation such hardware failures could propagate to circuit level in the form of 
signal delays, changes of circuit functionality, and signals stuck at a logic value (0 or 
1), which could further propagate into the software layer and affect the reliability of 
the software. 
The proposed methodology is divided into three parts: (i) analysis of the 
manifestations of permanent failures on circuit elements (logic gates, flip-flops, etc.), 
(ii) development of reliability models for the circuit elements as functions of the 
software execution, and (iii) calculation of failure probability distributions of the 
hardware circuit elements under the software execution. 
The methodology is applied to a comprehensive case study, targeting all the 
CPU registers and ALU logic gates of a computer system based on the Z80 
microprocessor. About 120 different types of failure manifestations are observed, and 
more than 250 reliability models for the different types of failure manifestations and 
circuit elements are developed. Such models allow us to calculate the failure 
probability distributions of the CPU registers and ALU gates of the Z80 computer 
system under the software execution. We also extend the methodology and the case 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
As human technologies advance, software plays an increasingly important role 
in almost all systems (military, communication, transportation, space, energy, etc), 
and the development of software and systems that are safe and reliable becomes 
crucial. Ignoring software risks can lead to catastrophic consequences. About 430 
people died in eight fatal accidents (1985-2003) where software was the root cause. A 
study by the FAA revealed that 40% of the problems in large aircrafts (1984-1994) 
were software related. In NASA, software has become a major risk factor in space 
missions and projects. Software failures account for a large percentage of problem 
reports for NASA projects. For one spacecraft, 33.9% of the total number of failures 
found during ground testing was software related. This rate was higher than any other 
category. Other missions, such as Magellan launched in 1989 and Voyager in 1977, 
experienced software failures as 19–20% of all failures. Other examples of well-
known spacecraft accidents provoked by software malfunction include: the explosion 
of the Ariane 5 launcher on its maiden flight in 1996, the loss of the Mars Climate 
Orbiter in 1999, the destruction of the Mars Polar Lander in 2000, the placing of a 
Milstar satellite in an incorrect and unusable orbit in 1999, and the loss of contact 
with the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) spacecraft in 1998 [1]. The use of 
reliability methods and techniques can help significantly reduce the risk of these 




Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is today the most significant and extended 
technique from the reliability domain. It aims at assessing, predicting and reducing 
the risk of failures in large technological systems such as nuclear power plants, 
chemical plants and aerospace systems. In NASA, PRA is required for all manned 
missions as well as for all missions with nuclear payload or nuclear fuel (e.g., such as 
the Crew Exploration Vehicle and other Moon–Mars–Beyond missions). However, 
current practice in PRA systematically neglects the contribution of software to the 
risk of failure of the system. The classical PRA methodology accounts for hardware 
and human interventions but does not account for software. In certain domains (such 
as nuclear), software has been confined to some extent to non-safety related functions. 
There also exists a reticence in the software safety community to use quantitative 
estimates of software failures. It stems essentially from the fact that software is still a 
new artifact. However, more and more vital functions, which in the past were 
controlled by human operators or hardware components, are today implemented and 
controlled by software. Thus, traditional PRA techniques are no longer valid and need 
to be improved and extended to include software reliability. Ignoring the contribution 
of software to system risk can lead to catastrophic consequences, such as the 
examples described above. 
Recently, important efforts have been undertaken to incorporate software risks 
into the PRA technique [2, 3]. The work reported in [3] proposes a taxonomy of 
software failures as a first step to integrate software risks into PRA. The software is 
seen as an essential component of a system, which interacts with its environment 




platform will take inputs from other subsystems (either software or hardware or 
humans) and produce outputs that will be used by either humans, other software or 
hardware. According to this view, a distinction is made between failures occurring 
within the software component itself and failures occurring due to the interaction 
between the software and its environment. This leads to the distinction of several 
software-related failure modes: internal failures, input failures, output failures, 
support failures and multiple interaction failures. Internal failures are due to the 
presence of “bugs” within the software code. Input failures are those out-of-bound 
values sent to the software that may drive correct software to provide incorrect 
outputs. Output failures are actually the set of out-of-bound software output behaviors 
that are neither due to out-of-bound input behavior nor due to internal software 
malfunction. These are failures that occur because of inconsistencies between 
specifications of the software and its downstream component. Multiple interaction 
failures are related to synchronization/communication problems between software 
processes and other system processes (software, hardware or human processes) that 
execute concurrently. Support failures are those software failures induced by 
malfunctions in the hardware support platform that the software resides on. They 
include failures due to competition for computing resources (deadlock, lockout) and 
computer platform physical failures (CPU failures, memory failures and I/O devices 
failures). The research work proposed in this dissertation is one component of the 
current work being done to characterize of this latter type of failure, i.e. computer 




That hardware failures may lead to abnormal software behavior has been long 
recognized. The very first bug report described a bug-related hardware failure (On 
September 9, 1945, when Mark II, the Aiken Relay Calculator was experiencing 
problems, an investigation showed that there was a moth trapped between the points 
of Relay #70) [4]. More recently Iyer and Velardi [5] discovered that 35 percent of 
software failures in MVS systems were determined to be hardware-failure-related. 
Fault injection techniques have emerged as the major means to study the hardware 
failure phenomenon and its impact on the system [6]. Fault injection techniques, as a 
supplement to traditional software testing, are ideal for revealing the software and 
system’s behaviors under abnormal hardware conditions, which may not be able to be 
addressed by their counterparts (such as software testing). Fault injection aims at 
assessing the system behavior in the presence of faults [7-9]. A key concern related to 
fault injection is the representativeness of the injected faults, i.e., the plausibility of 
the fault model with respect to actual faults [10]. In the majority of published works, 
the fault location, the fault type, and the time at which the fault is injected are 
randomly selected [7, 11]. Such a fault injection profile does not represent the actual 
hardware conditions in system operation. Therefore software reliability due to 
hardware support failures cannot be credibly assessed.  
The impact of hardware failure on the software and on the system has attracted 
substantial attention in the field: 
Kumar et al. introduced a simulation-based software model for application-
specific dependability analysis of a system [12]. The model represents an application 




edges and a mapping of the nodes to memory. The model simulates the execution of 
the program while faults are injected into the program’s memory space. The authors 
claim that all hardware-related faults can be mapped as memory faults, but do not 
prove this formally. In addition, the authors do not clearly explain the types of faults 
injected, and how the injection is accomplished.  
Todd Delong et al conducted a similar study to estimate the dependability 
parameters of computer systems [13]. The system hardware was modeled using a 
VHDL script. Stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 faults were injected into all the visible 
(programmable) processor registers. This work did not cover bit flipping or transient 
hardware failures. Nor did it provide the location and frequency distribution of stuck-
at-0 and stuck-at-1 faults. 
Amendola et al conducted a study to investigate the fault behavior of a 
microprocessor system [14]. They studied the faults located in memory, internal 
registers of the processor, and busses. Single bit-flipping faults were introduced into 
the VHDL system model of busses, memory, and CPU. This work demonstrated 
whether the system could tolerate faults, but could not provide reliability information 
due to the lack of fault location and distribution information. Choi et al [15] 
conducted a similar study with identical drawbacks.  
D. Gil et al performed a fault injection experiment to analyze the “error 
syndrome” of a microcomputer system [16]. The system under study was described 
using VHDL. His experiment considered different types of faults with different 




However there was no prior knowledge of fault frequency or the distribution of fault 
locations and types.  
In these approaches, fault injection is used as an accelerated testing technique to 
speed up the occurrence of errors and failures (e.g., likely and unlikely faults are 
given the same probability over location and time), and so do not capture the actual 
environmental conditions leading to the production of the faults impacting the 
software. The set of real faults may not be completely covered by the injected faults. 
More important, reliability estimates on software failures related to a particular 
operational situation of the system cannot be obtained (e.g., probability that the 
software of a spacecraft fails due to faults in the microelectronics devices when it will 
be traveling to Mars following a particular trajectory). In order to use the fault 
injection technique to calculate reliability estimates of software failures due to 
hardware malfunction, it is first necessary to characterize the physical operating 
conditions leading to a hardware malfunction from a probabilistic viewpoint. This 
problem is related to the development of the so-called software operational profiles.  
The operational profile (OP) is a quantitative characterization of the way in 
which a system will be used [17]. It associates a set of probabilities to the system 
input space, and therefore characterizes the input stimuli of the system in operation. 
The determination of the OP can help guide managerial and engineering decisions 
throughout the whole software development lifecycle [17]. For instance, the OP can 
assist in the allocation of resources and optimization of reviews and code inspections 
and act as a guideline for software testing. The OP of a system is also a major 




reliability by testing the software in a manner such that the OP represents the 
system’s actual use. It is also used to quantify the propagation of defects (or 
unreliability) through finite state machine models [2, 3]. However, determining the 
OP of a system is a difficult part of software reliability assessment in general [18]. 
The OP is traditionally built by enumerating field inputs and evaluating their 
occurrence frequencies. Musa pioneered a five-step approach to develop the OP [17]. 
His approach is based on collecting information on customers and users, identifying 
the system modes, determining the functional profile and recording the input states 
and their associated occurrence probabilities experienced in field operation. Expert 
opinion is normally used to estimate the hardware components-related operational 
profile due to the lack of field data. Musa’s approach has been widely utilized and 
adapted in the literature to generate the operational profile. Some of these 
applications are summarized hereafter: 
Chruscielski and Tian applied Musa’s approach to a Lockheed Martin Tactical 
Aircraft System’s cartridge support system [19]. User surveys which were generated 
in the format of a Questionnaire for User Interface Satisfaction, were used instead of 
the field data.  
Elbaum and Narla refined Musa’s approach by addressing heterogeneous user 
groups. They discovered that a single operational profile only “averages” the usage 
and “obscures” the real information about the operational probabilities [20]. They 
utilized clustering to identify groups of similar customers.  
Gittens et al proposed an extended OP model composed of the process profile, 




associated frequencies. The structural profile accounts for the system structure, the 
configuration or structure of the actual application, while the data profile covers the 
inputs to the application from different users [21]. 
Different values of the environment inputs will have major effects on processing. 
So Musa’s [17] recommended approach for identifying the environmental variables is 
to have several experienced system design engineers identify them by brainstorming a 
list of those variables that might necessitate the program to respond in different ways. 
Furthermore, Sandfoss [22] suggests that the estimation of occurrence probabilities 
could be based on figures obtained from project documentation, engineering, 
judgment and system development experience. According to Gittens [21], a specific 
operational profile should include all users and all operating conditions that can affect 
the system.  
Musa’s approach and other extended approaches all require either field data or 
historic usage data. They all use an assumption that field data or historic usage data 
cover the entire input domain. This assumption is not always true and their 
approaches are not always successful simply because some input data may not be 
available, especially for safety critical systems. At least two reasons lead to the 
unavailability of the entire input data spectrum. First, the system may not be widely 
used (e.g., a reactor control system of a nuclear power plant). Therefore, very little 
field and historic usage data can be obtained. Second, the field data does not cover the 
entire spectrum of the input domain because some conditions may be extremely rare 
(e.g., unexpected inputs such as hardware failures). Further, many inputs may not be 




None of the related research on OP addresses the problem of characterizing the 
abnormal (or unexpected) software inputs delivered by the hardware devices 
supporting the software execution. The main contributions of the methodology 
proposed in this dissertation with respect to the related work on OP are the following: 
 Consideration of the hardware platform. The majority of the related research 
on OP focuses on the characterization of environmental system data from a 
high-level perspective (e.g., physical data captured by sensors). This means 
that the boundaries of the OP are external to the computer system executing 
the software. Our work pushes those boundaries into the computer system 
itself by considering the contribution of the computer hardware platform to 
the OP.  
 Characterization of unexpected inputs. Available methods and techniques 
for building the OP normally consider functional software inputs. We focus 
on nonfunctional inputs based on unexpected (or abnormal) data delivered 
by the hardware platform to the software. In other words, our interest is in 
hardware failures that may impact the behavior of the software components 
of the computer system.  
 Use of well-established reliability methods and techniques. Existing 
approaches rely on expert opinion, field data or historical usage data to build 
the OP. Our methodology is built from well-known and established 
reliability methods and techniques from the microelectronics domain.  
The proposed methodology thus constitutes a step forward in the OP research 




providing precise estimates of the actual system’s operating conditions. Such an OP is 
referred to as software-specific hardware failure profile. For a given system with a 
computer platform executing a particular application software, the software-specific 
hardware failure profile is defined by tuple <p, i, f, t> denoting the probability p that a 
hardware device i is affected by failure f at time t. The software-specific hardware 
failure profile is thus the basis to extend the use of the fault injection technique to the 
reliability prediction of the impact of hardware failures on software. The development 
of the software-specific hardware failure profile requires that the mechanisms leading 
to hardware failures in a computer platform be carefully considered. To calculate the 
different variables of the software-specific hardware failure profile, we have 
developed a set of analytical and simulation-based methods that account for the 
underlying physics and environmental phenomena leading to the production of 
hardware failures in computer platforms during system operation.  
The software execution on hardware devices, in essence, is a series of 0 and 1 
signal alternations for the inputs of hardware components. Such signal alternations 
lead to voltage changes and current flows in the microelectronic hardware device. 
The voltage and current act as electrical stresses on the device and may lead to 
physical changes, also referred to as degradations. Failure occurs when degradation 
reaches the point where the device can no longer perform its intended functions. 
Hardware failures created during circuit operation can be categorized into 
intrinsic and extrinsic failures. Extrinsic failures are the failures not related to the 
device circuitry itself, but failures extrinsic to the chip, such as open wire bonds in 




devices due to limitations of the material properties of the silicon chip or limitations 
of the manufacturing process. Examples of manufacturing process defects are ion 
contamination and atom gradients caused by mechanical stresses. Such non-lethal 
defects can grow into lethal ones when stressed by different failure mechanisms. One 
type of failure mechanism stresses the device through environmental conditions (e.g. 
temperature and humidity), which are not related to the software execution during 
device operation. Typical mechanisms of this type include Temperature Cycling [23, 
24] and Corrosion [25, 26], and Stress Migration [27]. The other type of failure 
mechanism degrades the circuitry during device operation when the device is put 
under dynamic voltage and current stresses due to software execution. The primary 
and most studied failure mechanism of this type are Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) [28-
31]; Electromigration (EM) [32-36] and Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown 
(TDDB) [37-42]. This work examines the hardware intrinsic failures caused by the 
electronic stresses introduced by the execution of the software during device 
operation. 
During device operation such failure mechanisms could cause shifting of device 
response parameters, such as voltage, capacitance, and resistance, to the point that 
they will not meet the designed values. For example, HCI could lead to shifts of 
threshold voltage, transconductance, mobility and saturation current of MOSFET 
transistors, while EM could increase the resistance of metal interconnects. 
The best way to model the failure mechanisms is from the physics-of-failure 
point of view. If this can be accomplished, one could have a complete picture of how 




currently prevents us from completely modeling the physics-of-failure. Without 
detailed knowledge of the device physics, the best option to represent device failures 
is through probabilistic statistical models. Such models use observed relationships 
between failure times and various input parameters, such as voltage and current, to 
generate probabilistic assessments of when failures may occur [43]. Accelerated Life 
Testing (ALT) techniques are used to model the relationship between device lifetime 
and different electrical stresses [44]. 
Device failures due to such failure mechanisms will result in changes of circuit 
functionality, which will affect the execution of software running on the hardware 
platform. To study the impact of the hardware failures on software reliability, we 
have to investigate the circuit behaviors under the presence of hardware failures 
caused by these failure mechanisms. The connections between device failure 
mechanisms and circuit functionality are the failure equivalent circuit models. The 
underlying concept of the failure equivalent circuit models is to model device 
degradation with some additional lumped circuit elements (transistors, resistors, 
dependent current sources, etc.) to capture the behavior of a damaged circuit element 
in the circuit operation environment. In the past years, several failure equivalent 
circuit models have been developed for different failure mechanisms [45-51]. Most of 
these circuit models are based on the SPICE simulation platform, which is the de 
facto tool in circuit design.  
Li et al adopted a one-dimensional HCI transistor degradation model, developed 
by Leblebici [47], and built a two-transistor HCI degradation model. The model is 




Carrier Injection [52]. The study showed that circuit delays induced by HCI cannot be 
ignored in submicron devices. 
Segura et al investigated the circuit functionality of CMOS gates with damaged 
gate oxide due to TDDB failure mechanism. The failure equivalent circuit model 
consists of a series connection of two transistors and a resistance between the gate 
and the common terminal [53]. 
The above studies focused on only one particular type of failure mechanism. 
Most similar works consider different failure mechanisms separately. However, in 
order to conduct a system wide reliability estimation, all related failure mechanisms 
should be accounted for. 
Srinvasan et al developed an architecture-level microprocessor model that is 
used to calculate processor lifetime reliability. Multiple failure mechanisms are 
included in the model to investigate the hardware lifetime with the consideration of 
some environment stresses (thermal cycling and mechanical stresses). The emphasis 
of the work is to dynamically provide processor failure rate information under 
different software applications and environmental stress conditions [54]. The software 
applications are used to simulate hardware device operation. However, the work does 
not provide a way to use the hardware reliability information for the evaluation of 
software reliability due to hardware failures. The main contributions of the 
methodology proposed in this dissertation with respect to the related work on 
hardware reliability are the following: 
 It systematically calculates the hardware reliability during device operation 




hardware and software in the creation of hardware failures are thus taken 
into account. 
 We have considered all those failure mechanisms (HCI, EM, and TDDB) 
that are activated as a result of hardware usage induced by software 
execution. In other words, it accounts for a comprehensive set of hardware 
device intrinsic failure mechanisms that are directly related to software 
execution during device operation. 
 It not only accounts for the failure probability of the circuit, but also 
investigates the probability of all possible failure manifestations (delays, 
stuck-at signals, changes of circuit functionalities, etc.) induced by the 
different failure mechanisms considered. 
 It provides software-specific hardware reliability information, which is the 
basis for estimating the software reliability induced by hardware support 
failures. 
 Most related research focuses on hardware reliability [47, 52, 53], and does 
not analyze the impact of hardware failures on software. The study by 
Srinvasan [54] considers the software only as a means to simulate the 
hardware operation, without systematic consideration of the influence of the 
software on hardware failures. Therefore, none of the related work analyzes 
the interactions and interdependencies between hardware and software with 
respect to reliability. Thus, this work is a bridge between microelectronic 




1.2 Contents of the Dissertation 
The contents of the dissertation are described as follows. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the different types of permanent failures that impact 
semiconductor devices. The analysis is performed at the different hardware design 
levels: physical device level, logic level and register transfer level. In particular, we 
first study permanent failures at the physical level (e.g., intrinsic and extrinsic failures, 
electrical stress failures, etc.). In this dissertation, we focus on the intrinsic failure 
induced by HCI, EM, and TDDB failure mechanisms during device operation. Then 
the way in which the failures propagate and manifest at higher hardware levels (e.g., 
delay, stuck-at value, different functionality, etc.) is examined. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology proposed for the analysis of the impact of 
permanent hardware failures on software reliability. The methodology is divided into 
three parts: (i) analysis of the manifestations of permanent failures on circuit elements 
(logic gates, flip-flops, etc.), (ii) development of reliability models as functions of the 
software execution, and (iii) calculation of failure probability distributions of the 
hardware circuit elements under the software execution. The analysis of the failure 
manifestation is performed through the use of SPICE simulations and failure 
equivalent circuit models. The reliability models take into account existing models for 
the DC stress failure rates, and integrate new models for the corresponding duty 
factors. These models also consider the way in which software executes through the 
hardware circuit elements in a computer system. The calculation of the failure 





Chapter 4 consists of a comprehensive case study. The methodology is applied to all 
the CPU registers and ALU logic gates of a computer system based on the Z80 
microprocessor. About 120 different types of failure manifestations have been 
observed, and more than 250 reliability models for the different types of failure 
manifestation and circuit element developed. Several structures for the reliability 
models and different notations for the failure manifestations are proposed in order to 
handle the complexity of the reliability models and obtain a practical and reduced set 
of models. Such models are used for the calculation of the failure probability 
distributions of the CPU registers and ALU gates of the Z80 computer system under 
the software execution. 
Chapter 5 extends the methodology and the case study to the consideration of 
transient failures or SEUs (Single Event Upsets). First, a study of the causes and 
manifestations of transient failure in semiconductor devices is provided. Then, we 
develop reliability models for transient failures, which integrate into the same 
framework a set of well-known analytical models for the failure rate calculation of 
Single Event Upsets (SEUs). These take into account SEUs induced by cosmic ray 
particles (heavy ions and protons), neutrons present in the atmosphere, as well as 
neutrons emitted by nuclear reactors such as the ones that will be used in future 
nuclear-owered space missions from NASA. The models use design and technology 
parameters of the IC hardware devices, the operational environment characteristics 
(radiation particle fluxes) as well as the specifications of the system and mission (e.g., 




of transient failures by calculating the failure probability distributions due to SEUs of 
the hardware devices of the Z80 based computer system. 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusions of the dissertation and proposes future research 
directions. 
1.3 Summary of Contributions 
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows. 
It takes into account the influence of the software execution, the operational 
environment and the semiconductor design and technology in the creation and 
activation phenomena of hardware failures.  
It includes the whole spectrum of hardware failures that can arise during the 
system operation, i.e. not only Single Event Upsets (SEUs), but also permanent 
semiconductor device failures due to Hot Carrier Injection, Electromigration, and 
Oxide Breakdown.  
It considers all the possible locations for the hardware failures, i.e. not only 
sequential logic circuits (registers, memory cells, etc.) but also combinational logic 
circuits (logic gates) 
It analyzes the propagation of failures under particular operational conditions 
(including the software execution) and precisely determines the form under which 
each hardware failure manifests (stuck-at-1, stuck-at-0, bit-flip, change of 
functionality, etc.) at circuit level. 
It takes into account the usage of the hardware circuit elements due to software 
execution during the operational life of the system and provides the failure probability 




hardware reliability engineers to improve the system reliability more efficiently by 
focusing on the most failure-prone circuit elements. 
It can be used to extend the use of the fault injection technique to the software 
reliability prediction under hardware failures and allows for precisely defining 
representative fault models that can be used in fault injection techniques and tools. It 
also provides the basis to develop testbeds based on software implemented fault 
injection (SWIFI) to calculate the final failure probability of the software application. 





Chapter 2 Hardware Failures 
 
The term “hardware failures” refers to the malfunction of semiconductor devices 
(Physical Device Level) and their impact (or propagation) on higher hardware levels, 
namely the Logic Gate Level and the Register Transfer Level (RTL). In this work we 
also use the term hardware faults as a synonym for hardware failures, since the latter 
can also be the origin or cause of further errors and failures at higher layers of the 
system (e.g., software layer). Irrespective of the level considered, hardware failures 
can be classified according to their duration into permanent (remain indefinitely), 
transient (have a limited duration) and intermittent (as transients, but manifest 
repeatedly). In this work, we analyze the mechanisms and events leading to 
permanent failures at the physical level as well as their impact on the higher hardware 
levels. Intermittent failures are not addressed because they are produced by the same 
mechanisms as permanent failures (moreover many of them eventually transform into 
permanent failures). An analysis of the impact of transient failures on software 
reliability will be conducted in Chapter 5.  
2.1 Permanent Physical Failures 
Permanent failures are irreversible physical defects in semiconductor devices 
introduced during manufacturing or system operation. In general, permanent failures 
can be divided into intrinsic, extrinsic and electrical stress failures [32].  
Intrinsic failures are related to defects of semiconductor devices due to 
limitations of material properties of the silicon chip or limitations of the 




lethal (e.g., material impurities), or result in a device being fatally defective (e.g., an 
open in metal interconnect). Examples of manufacturing processes related defects 
include ion contamination (Surface Inversion) and atom gradients caused by 
mechanical stresses (Stress Migration). Semiconductor material properties are 
stressed by both the environmental conditions (temperature and humidity) and the 
operational usage (voltage and current). These stressors are called wear-out 
mechanisms, and may cause non-lethal defects to become lethal. The environmental 
wear-out mechanisms include Temperature Cycling (mechanical fatigue of the 
devices due to the temperature) and Corrosion (due to humidity). The wear-out 
mechanisms related to the operational usage are Hot Carrier Injection (HCI), 
Electromigration (EM) and Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) [55]. 
Extrinsic failures are identified with the interconnection and packaging of the 
silicon chips. Typical failure mechanisms include die fracture, open bond joints, voids 
at bonds, etc., which are external to the device circuitry itself. 
Electrical stress failures are generally caused by discrete events introduced 
during device handling in service. These damaging events include Electrostatic 
Discharge (ESD) and Electrical Overstress (EOS). 
The focus of this work is on hardware failures that are directly introduced during 
the device operation, that is, intrinsic permanent failures due to operational usage 
(HCI, EM and TDDB). Whenever software executes on hardware platform, the 
hardware device is stressed by these failure mechanisms. The corresponding failures, 
in turn, may cause software-execution errors, which means software reliability will be 




to the execution of software. It also provides necessary information to evaluate 
software reliability induced by these hardware failures. 
Intrinsic failures caused by environmental stressors can impact how software 
executes in a microprocessor. However, they are not induced by the execution of 
software. For example, corrosion failures occur when the hardware device are in the 
presence of moisture and contaminants. The lifetime of corrosion failures is expressed 
as a function of relative humidity and temperature [25, 26]. Stress migration failures 
are induced when the device is put under mechanical stresses. The lifetime of stress 
migration failures is expressed as a function of mechanical stress load and 
temperature [27]. Such environmental stresses are not introduced by software 
execution, and they could cause hardware failures even when the device is operating. 
They are not the focus of this work. The impact of such failures on software 
reliability could be studied in future work. 
Similarly, even though extrinsic and electrical stress permanent failures can also 
impact the system in operation, they are not introduced directly due to software 
execution. Therefore, these failures are not considered in this study. 
2.1.1 Hot Carrier Injection Failure Mechanism 
 
Hot Carrier Injection (HCI) refers to the phenomenon by which carriers 
(electrons or holes) at the drain end of a MOSFET (Metal-Oxide Semiconductor 
Field-Effect Transistor) transistor gain sufficient energy to be injected into the gate 
oxide and cause shifts of some MOSFET parameters, such as threshold voltage, 
transconductance, mobility and saturation current. This occurs as carriers move along 




field effect transistor) and experience impact ionization near the drain end of the 
device due to a high lateral electric field. Some high-energy electrons and/or holes 
produced by the impact ionization are redirected and accelerated to the interface of 
the oxide and silicon surface. A few of these “lucky” carriers overcome the surface 
energy barrier, inject into the oxide, and generate interface states and oxide charges. 
The shifts of threshold voltage and transconductance are proportional to the average 
density of “traps” (imperfections in a semiconductor material that can capture a free 
electron or hole), which in turn is inversely proportional to the effective channel 
length.  
Due to the higher mobility and lower energy barrier, hot electrons are much 
easier to be injected into the oxide than hot holes, which means that nMOSFET 
transistors are more prone to HCI effects than pMOSFET transistors. Therefore, 
pMOSFET transistors are seldom a limiting factor in the reliability of a CMOS 
technology, and can be usually ignored from reliability estimates [28, 56].  


























exp  (2.1) 
where  
HCDA  the model prefactor determined from life testing 
subI  the average substrate current 
n  a technology related constant 
W  the transistor channel width 




κ   Boltzmann’s constant 
T  the absolute temperature 
2.1.2 Electromigration Failure Mechanism 
 
Electromigration (EM) is the mass transport of a metal due to the momentum 
exchange between the conducting electrons that move in the applied electric field and 
the metal atoms that make up the interconnecting material. It exists wherever electric 
current flows through metal wires. The EM failure lifetime model of a metal  






















exp  (2.2) 
where 
EMA   the model prefactor 
I   the average current 
A   the cross section of the interconnects 
T   the absolute temperature 
aEME   the activation energy for EM failure mechanism  
k   Boltzmann’s constant 
mn,  material and failure mode dependent parameters 
EM decreases the reliability of ICs. In the worst case, it leads to the eventual loss 
of one or more connections and intermittent failure of the entire circuit. Since the 
reliability of interconnects is not only of great interest for space travel and military 
applications but also for civilian applications like the anti-lock braking system of cars, 




2.1.3 Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown Failure Mechanism 
 
When an electric field is applied to the dielectric-isolated gate of a MOSFET, the 
progressive degradation of the dielectric material will result in the formation of 
conductive paths in the oxide and a shortening of the anode and cathode. When this 
happens, the continuous stress of the electric field on the gate oxide may lead to 
excessive energy dissipation, or even thermal runaway, through breakdown paths. 
The electrical after-effects of oxide breakdown are an abrupt increase in gate current 
and a loss of gate voltage controllability on device current flowing between drain and 
source. This kind of failure mechanism is known as Time Dependent Dielectric 
Breakdown (TDDB) or oxide breakdown, and the degradation process will be 
accelerated as the thickness of the gate oxide decreases with continued device scaling. 




















tddb β  (2.3) 
where 
TDDBA   the model prefactor 
dcba ,,,   empirically determined constants 
A   the device gate oxide area of the transistor, equivalent to  
  W (channel width) × L (channel length)  
gsV   the gate-to-source voltage 
T   the absolute temperature  





2.2 Impact on Higher Hardware Levels 
Microelectronic hardware circuit design, especially digital IC design, can be 
divided into four different abstraction levels, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
 Behavioral Level: it describes the function (or behavior) components of the 
system. It specifies the input and output of the component and the function 
the component carries. 
 Register Transfer Level (RTL): a behavioral component is decomposed into 
combinational logic and storage elements. The storage element (flip flop, 
latch) is normally controlled by the system clock. The combinational logic 
provides access control to the storage element. 
 Logic Level: the design is represented as a netlist (or combination) with 
different logic gates (AND, OR, NOT, etc.) and storage elements. The 
difference between this level and the RTL level is that one can observe the 
individual gates at this level but only blocks that represent storage and 
combinational logic at the RTL level.   
 Layout Level: this level is the bottom of the hierarchy. This level describes 
the layout of the actual transistors and their inter-connections.  
 




In the previous section, the analysis of permanent failures was described at the 
physical device level of the hardware, that is, with respect to the transistor elements 
and their physical interconnections, which are the building blocks of the circuit layout. 
Usually, IC design process starts from the top level (i.e., behavioral level) and goes 
down step-by-step to the layout level for the targeted semiconductor technology node.  
RTL level consists of combinational logic circuits and storage elements, which 
are further decomposed into discrete logic gates and flip-flops at the logic gate level, 
as illustrated in an example of RTL design in Figure 2.2.  
As explained in Section 2.1, a permanent failure at the physical level that 
becomes lethal leads to a transistor stuck-on/stuck-off or an open/short in a metal 
wire. At the logic and RT levels, these physical defects mainly manifest as stuck-at 
values (the logic voltage of a signal is stuck either at 0 or 1), indeterminate values 
(the logic voltage of a signal is neither 0 nor 1) and signal delays. Also, the 
propagation of permanent failures may lead to a functionality change of a 
combinational logic element, e.g., a transistor stuck-on failure in a NAND gate could 
change the truth table of the gate, making it behave differently than desired [57]. 
Besides, permanent failures can also propagate from the combinational logic to the 
storage elements in the form of bit-flips. Note that stuck-at values are not the only 
























This chapter describes the methodology for the analysis of permanent hardware 
failure manifestations. The methodology consists of three phases, which are described 
as follows. 
During the first phase of the methodology (analysis of failure manifestations), 
SPICE simulation is performed to investigate the behavior of the circuit elements 
(logic gates and flip-flops) under study with a set of generic input stimuli, which 
covers all possible combinations of logic levels and transitions of the input signals. 
This allows for calculating the failure rates of different circuit elements. A set of 
failure equivalent circuit models for different failure mechanisms, including HCI, EM 
and TDDB is used to study the circuit failure manifestations under the presence of 
hardware failures. The main outcome of this phase consists of the set of 
manifestations of the permanent failures observed in the circuits’ output signals (e.g., 
signal delays, functionality changes or stuck-at failures). 
During the second phase of the methodology (development of reliability models), 
a set of reliability models are built that allow for calculating the occurrence rate of 
each failure manifestation of a circuit as a function of the software execution profile 
of a computer system. The models are based not only on existing expressions for the 
constant stress failure rate of permanent failures, but also on specifically developed 
models that account for the operational conditions of circuits (e.g., current and 




software execution. Different structures and notations are proposed for the reliability 
models in order to reduce huge numbers of failure manifestations into practical sets of 
expressions. 
During the third phase of the methodology (calculation of failure probability 
distributions), the reliability models developed in the previous phase are applied to a 
particular computer platform. The usage of the hardware devices is obtained through 
VHDL simulations of the computer system under the execution of the software 
program of interest. This allows for solving the reliability models and calculating the 
failure probability distributions (per failure manifestation) of the various hardware 
devices of the computer platform (e.g., ALU gates, CPU registers, memories, etc.).  
The methodology is divided into five steps, two steps for the first phase, one for 
the second phase, and two for the third phase, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Each step 
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Figure 3.1 Methodology for the analysis of permanent failure manifestations 
 
3.1 Analysis of Failure Manifestations 
3.1.1 Calculation of Failure Rates and Characterization of Stress Patterns 
 
This section describes step 1 of Figure 3.1.  
As explained in Section 2.1, the hardware failures of interest in this study are 
intrinsic failures that are directly related to software execution. The execution of the 
software can be seen as a series of electrical signals based on logic 0s and 1s that 




Of all the intrinsic failure mechanisms, the three most dominant mechanisms are 
considered in this study. They are Hot Carrier Injection (HCI), Electromigration (EM), 
and Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB). 
Based on the lifetime models (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) discussed in section 2.1, the 
corresponding failure rates of a circuit element (transistor or metal interconnection) 


















=λ  (3.3) 
Failure rates expressed in (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are referred to as constant (or DC) 
stress failure rates, since lifetime models (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) for the reliability 
evaluation of the different failure mechanisms are obtained from accelerated testing 
experiments under DC stress conditions. For example, to obtain the HCI lifetime 
model (equation (2.1)), a series of accelerated life testing experiments are conducted 
at several substrate current and temperature combinations for the transistors. For a 
particular combination, the testing is performed by keeping the substrate current and 
temperature constant during the total testing time. The failure data obtained from 
testing are then used to extract parameters in the lifetime model by means of 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The models for EM and TDDB 




With the lifetime models, the failure rates of all the failure mechanisms can be 
calculated if we have the device operation conditions, such as the gate to source 
voltages (Vgs) and substrate currents of the transistors. The device operation 
condition can be obtained through SPICE simulation. 
SPICE stands for Simulation Program with Integrated Circuits Emphasis. It is a 
general-purpose circuit simulation program for nonlinear dc, nonlinear transient, and 
linear ac analyses. SPICE provides a detailed analysis of active components including 
bipolar transistors, field effect transistors, and diodes, as well as lumped components, 
such as resistors, capacitors and inductors. Note that SPICE is a circuit simulation 
program, not a logic simulation program. Thus SPICE considers the voltages and 
currents in a circuit to be continuous quantities, not quantized into high/low values. 
Other constants, fitting parameters, and activation energies can be extracted from 
experimental data (e.g., accelerated stress tests or industry data).  
SPICE uses as main inputs the schematics of a circuit of the technology under 
consideration (e.g. Figure 3.3), and the input signal stimuli (e.g., Figure 3.4 and 






Figure 3.2 Circuit Layout of an AND2_1 logic gate 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Schematic of the AND2_1 logic gate 
 
As an example, consider an AND2_1 logic gate implementing logic operation 




gate belongs to standard cell library vtvtlib25 developed by the Virginia Tech VLSI 
for Telecommunication (VTVT) Group [58, 59], based on TSMC 0.25 µm 
technology. The physical layout of this gate is shown in Figure 3.2. It is composed of 
6 transistors ( 0M , 1M ,  2M , 3M , 4M , and 5M ) and 5 interconnections ( 1N , 2N , 
3N , 4N , 5N ). The corresponding schematic is shown in Figure 3.3. The AND2_1 
logic gate is used throughout this section to illustrate the methodology.  
For the purposes of our analysis, the input signals to a circuit are designed 
according to the following criteria:  
The set of input signals includes all the possible combinations for logic levels 
(1’s and 0’s) and transitions (rising and falling edges). We assume that two or more 
transitions in different lines cannot happen at the same time.  
The set of input signals leads to the same duration for every combination of logic 
levels. The actual duration of a pulse is not important for our analysis, while the value 
for the duration of a transition period will be given by the particular semiconductor 
technology under analysis.  
We refer to a set of input signals matching these criteria as Standardized Inputs. 






Figure 3.4 Asynchronous input signals 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Asynchronous and synchronous (clock) input signals 
 
Consider the 2-asynchronous input signals of Figure 3.4. The first criterion is 
fulfilled since  
 there is a rising transition in the first input when the second input is high or 
low,  
 there is a falling transition in the first input when the second input is high or 
low,  





 there is a falling transition in the second input when the first input is high or 
low,  
 all logic levels (‘00’, ‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’) are present. The second criterion is 
fulfilled since the percentage of time for each logic combination of the input 
lines is the same (namely, a2  for combinations ‘01’, ‘10’, ‘11’, and cb +  
for ‘00’, where cba +=2 ).  
It can be shown in a similar way that the two inputs of Figure 3.5 (consisting of 
an asynchronous signal and the clock line) also fulfill the criteria.  
The criteria used for the design of the input signals allow for “capturing” all the 
different patterns (including their relative time intervals) of the occurrence of the 
failure mechanisms in a circuit. Indeed, transistors and interconnects suffer from HCI, 
EM and TDDB stresses only for specific combinations and time intervals of logic 
levels and transitions of the input signals. We refer to these combinations as stress 
patterns. This is illustrated in Figure 3.6, where some stress patterns of the AND2_1 



























c) TDDB effect in transistor M2 in terms of Vgs 






A transistor suffers from HCI stress only during transition periods, when both 
gate voltage and drain voltage are high enough and there is current flowing through 
the channel (parameter subI  of equation (2.1)). For transistor 0M of the AND2_1 gate, 
such conditions appear whenever there is a rising edge (‘↑’) in the first input (I1) and 
the second input (I2) is high (‘1’) (i.e., instant 1.2µs in Figure 3.6a). For transistor 
1M , it appears whenever the first input (I1) is high (‘1’) and there is a rising edge 
(‘↑’) in the second input (I2) (i.e., instant 0.250µs in Figure 3.6a). 
A metal wire suffers from EM whenever there is an electric current flowing 
through it. For CMOS circuits, the current flow in an interconnection is negligible if 
the circuits are in static condition. However, switching input signals may introduce 
current pulses in the metal wires leading to EM. As shown in Figure 3.6b, EM arises 
in interconnect 2N  whenever there is a rising transition in input I2 while input I1 is 
high, or there is a falling transition in input I2 while input I1 is high (i.e., instants 
1.25µs and 1.45µs in Figure 3.6b). For interconnect 2N , it arises whenever there is a 
transition in one line while the other is high (i.e., instants 0.25µs, 0.5µs, 1.2µs and 
1.45µs in Figure 3.6b).  
Unlike HCI, TDDB stresses the gate dielectrics of the transistors even when they 
are in static state operations. As described in equation (2.3), the transistors lifetime 
due to TDDB stress strongly depends on the gate to source voltage gsV . For CMOS 
circuits, during normal device operation, most of the transistors experience certain 
periods during which the gate to source voltage gsV  value is equal to the power 
supply voltage ddV . The higher the percentage of such periods, the higher the failure 




systematically equal ddV  in transistor 2M  for logic levels ‘00’, ‘01’, and ‘10’ of 
inputs I1 and I2 (i.e., time intervals [0, 0.25], [0.5, 1.2] and [1.45, 2.0] in Figure 3.6c), 
leading to TDDB stress.  
3.1.2 Identification of Failure Manifestations 
 
This section describes step 2 of Figure 3.1.  
The identification of fault models is divided into the following steps:  
1) Development of a failure-equivalent-circuit model for the segments,  
2) Independent simulations of the element by substituting each time one 
segment by the failure-equivalent-circuit model,  
3) Observation of the output signal in each simulation and determination of the 
fault models.  




iλ ) are calculated for every transistor Mi  
and interconnection Ni  of a circuit element, a selection is made based on the 
elimination of those segments that are softly or not stressed by the failure 
mechanisms, so their impact in the global failure probability of the circuit can be 
neglected. This means that segment i  under stress j  will not be given any further 
consideration in our analysis if 0≈jiλ . This is for instance the case of the pMOSFET 
transistors of a circuit, which as explained in Section 3.1.1 are barely impacted by the 
HCI stress.  
Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 show an example of a segments selection for 




















































































Figure 3.9 Percentage of time a transistor suffers from TDDB stress 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the relative failure rates of the different transistors for HCI with 
respect to transistor M0. Figure 3.8 illustrates the relative failure rates of the different 
metal interconnects for EM with respect to N1. While Figure 3.9 displays the 
percentage time transistors suffer from TDDB stress. In this case, the segments 
selection simply leads to the elimination of the pMOSFET transistors under HCI 
stress (i.e., transistors 3M , 4M  and 5M ), and interconnection 4N  under EM stress.  
In order to account for the effect of different failure mechanisms on circuit 
functionality, several failure equivalent circuit models [51], one for each failure 
mechanism, are adopted to obtain circuit level failure manifestations through SPICE 
simulation (one per segment and failure mechanism). The underlying concept of the 
failure equivalent circuit models is to model device degradation with some additional 
lumped circuit elements (resistors, dependent current sources, etc.) to capture the 




the magnitude of element values, such as the resistance of the lumped resistor, the 
more severe the damage to circuit functionality. The failure equivalent circuit models 
are provided in Figure 3.10, Figure 3.11, and Figure 3.12. 
 
Figure 3.10 Failure equivalent circuit model for HCI mechanism 
 
 






Figure 3.12 Failure equivalent circuit model for TDDB mechanism 
 
The adopted HCI failure equivalent circuit model (Figure 3.10) is the Hot 
Carrier Induced Series Resistance Enhancement Model (HISREM), also named dRΔ  
model (proposed by Hwang [48] and improved in [51]). The model is composed of 
the original nMOSFET transistor connected in series with a voltage dependent drain 
resistor dRΔ , which reflects the process of hot carrier induced interface trap 
generation and therefore accounts for the channel mobility reduction and threshold 
voltage shift. The degree of circuit degradation is reflected by the value of resistor 
dRΔ . The more severe the HCI damage to the circuit, the higher the resistance value. 
The metal conductor used in current submicron CMOS technologies is 
constructed of a composite layered structure with a refractory metal layer on top and 
at the bottom of the aluminum alloy core metal. The effect of EM on the composite 
metal conductor is the increase of line resistance. Usually the failure criteria used in 




resistance increase by a fixed value [60]. The EM failure equivalent circuit model for 
a metal interconnect (Figure 3.11) is a resistor whose resistance value gets higher as 
the degradation becomes worse.  
The TDDB failure equivalent circuit model used (Figure 3.12) corresponds to 
the Maryland Circuit Reliability Oriented (MaCRO) model [51]. The electrical effect 
of TDDB is that it provides a conduction path to inject electrons from channel into 
gate. Therefore, a voltage dependent current source OXI  can be used to connect the 
gate and channel of the damaged transistor to model the effect of TDDB. The circuit 
model for nMOSFET is shown in Figure 3.12, in which two split transistors imitate 
the channel separation by oxide breakdown path, and the voltage-dependent current 
source OXI  physically represents the conduction mechanism of hard breakdown path 
across the oxide. The magnitude of OXI  reflects the degree of degradation of the 
TDDB failure mode. The model can be extended to pMOSFET by properly changing 
current flowing direction in Figure 3.12. 
The relation between the additional lumped circuit elements values used in the 
failure equivalent circuit models (such as the resistance of the resistors) and the 
lifetime models of the failure mechanisms (equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3)) is beyond 
the scope of this work. Therefore, the values for the mean time to failure of the circuit 
are calculated using equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) irrespective of how high it is 
necessary to increase the value of the lumped circuit elements to readily observe a 
failure manifestation.  
Assuming that the failure of a segment due to HCI, EM and TDDB damage 




to replace one segment at a time in the analysis. Each transistor of a circuit is to be 
replaced by the HCI and TDDB failure equivalent circuit models (Figure 3.10 and 
Figure 3.12), and each interconnection by the EM failure equivalent circuit model 
(Figure 3.11). Accordingly, if a circuit contains M  transistors and N  
interconnections, NM +2  mutated versions of the same circuit are produced. A 
“mutant” is thus a circuit in which a segment (transistor or interconnection) 
considered to be faulty is replaced by a failure equivalent circuit model. An example 
of one of such “mutants” for the AND2_1 gate circuit is provided in Figure 3.13, 
where transistor 5M  is replaced by the TDDB failure equivalent circuit model.  
 
Figure 3.13 AND2_1 layout with transistor M5 replaced by the TDDB failure 
equivalent circuit model 
 
The next step consists of running one independent SPICE simulation per 
mutated circuit. The objective is to determine whether the functional behavior of the 




so, the waveform of the circuit’s output signal is logged and analyzed after every 
simulation. The output waveforms obtained during this process for the AND2_1 gate 



























b) Failure manifestations observed in the output (Op) 
Figure 3.14 Failure manifestations of the AND2_1 logic gate due to HCI, EM and 





Figure 3.14b displays the failure manifestations of the AND2_1 gate, i.e., those 
output waveforms that differ from the correct output waveform (i.e., signal Op  in 
Figure 3.14a). As far as HCI is concerned, all the observed failure manifestations 
consist of output delays. The circuit behavior with a faulty transistor 0M  due to HCI 
leads to a delay of the output signal whenever its logic level changes from ‘0’ to ‘1’ 
(referred to as Delay-rise). A similar behavior is observed for a faulty 1M  transistor. 
On the other hand, the output is delayed during ‘1’ to ‘0’ transitions when transistor 
2M  is faulty (Delay-fall). Regarding EM stress, the observed failure manifestations 
correspond also to output delays: during ‘1’ to ‘0’ output transitions when there is a 
falling edge in signal 1Ip  and interconnection 1N  is faulty (Delay-fall-↓1); during ‘0’ 
to ‘1’ output transitions when interconnection 2N  (or 3N ) is faulty (Delay-rise); and 
during ‘1’ to ‘0’ output transitions when interconnection 5N  is faulty (Delay-fall). As 
far as TDDB is concerned, the observed failure manifestations are the following: 
stuck-at-0 fault when transistor 0M , 1M  or 5M  is faulty; stuck-at-1 fault when 
transistor 2M  is faulty; and different-function fault when transistor 3M  or 4M  is 
faulty. In this latter case, the different functions observed are respectively “stuck-at-
2Ip ” (DiffFunc-b) and “stuck-at- 1Ip ” (DiffFunc-a).  
The notation used for the failure manifestation is described in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Notation of the failure manifestations 
 Failure manifestation Description 
Delay-a The output signal is always delayed, either 
during rise or fall transitions. 
“Detailed 
manifestation”




combinations} logic combinations and transitions of the 
input signals (input combinations), either 
during rise or fall transitions. 
Stuck-at-{0, 1} The output signal is stuck at logic value 0 
or 1 
DiffFunc-{logic function} The circuit functionality changed to a 
different logic function. 
Delay-{value} The output signal is delayed either during 
rise or fall transitions. The percentage of 
rise or fall transitions affected is indicated 
by value. 





DiffFunc-{value} The circuit functionality changed to a 
different logic function. The percentage of 
logic combinations of the input signals 
leading to a different output logic level is 
indicated by value. 
 
The proposed methodology allows for obtaining very detailed information about 
the failure manifestations of a circuit. For example, it allows for determining whether 
a delay affects a rising or falling transition of the output signal, what the particular 




implements after a failure. These characteristics can be captured by the detailed 
manifestation notation proposed in Table 3.1. As an example, the failure 
manifestations presented in Figure 3.14b are labeled using the detailed notation. 
Table 3.1 also proposes a more compact notation for the failure manifestations, 
referred to as simplified manifestation. In this notation, delays are characterized by 
the number of deferred pulses of the output signal, while the different-function failure 
manifestation is characterized by the number of changes in the truth table of the 
circuit. As an example, failure manifestations Delay-rise and Delay-fall from Figure 
3.14b would be under label Delay-1 using the simplified notation (i.e., 100% of the 
pulses of the output signal are delayed), Delay-fall-↓1 under label Delay-0.5 (i.e., 
50% of the pulses of the output signal are delayed), and failure manifestations 
DiffFunc-a and DiffFunc-b under label DiffFunc-0.25 (i.e., one out of the four entries 
of the truth table of the AND2_1 gate is changed, namely entry “10” when the 
different function is “a”, and entry “01” when the different function is “b”).  
 
3.2 Development of Reliability Models 
This section describes step 3 of Figure 3.1.  
The development of reliability models is divided into the following steps:  
1) Modeling of the failure probability following a competing failure mode 
model.  
2) Modeling of the reliability depending on the number of demands per 




The lifetime of an entire circuit results from a combination of the effects of the 
different failure mechanisms across different segments (transistors and 
interconnections). This requires information on the lifetime distribution of each 
failure mechanism. In a complex integrated circuit, the whole system will be 
extremely prone to failure if any segment fails. We can therefore approximate a 
complex integrated circuit using a competing failure mode model. We apply the 
standard sum-of-failure-rates (SOFR) model [44] widely used in industry to 
determine a system’s failure rate from its individual failure mechanisms. Using the 
SOFR model, the failure rate λ  of a circuit (e.g., logic gate, flip-flop, etc.) can be 
related to the lifetime of segments (equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3)) as shown in 







,λλ  (3.4) 
where 
H   the set of hardware failure mechanisms (e.g., HCI, EM, TDDB) that 
impact the circuit,  
jS   the set of segments (transistors and interconnections) stressed by 
failure mechanism j , and 
ji,λ  the dynamic stress failure rate of segment i  under stress j .  
The dynamic stress failure rate ji,λ  can be calculated in different ways, for 
example by means of quasi static values or duty factors. We use duty factors to 





ijiji w λλ ,, =  (3.5) 
where 
j
iλ   the constant stress failure rate of segment i  under stress j  (i.e., 
equivalent to equations  (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3)), and  
jiw ,   the duty factor for 
j
iλ , which is equivalent to the percentage of time 
that segment i  is subjected to stress j  during the circuit operation under a particular 
software execution.  
The SOFR model elevates the reliability from transistor and interconnection 
levels to circuit level and is used to estimate lifetimes for various kinds of device 
families.  
The SOFR model described in (3.4) provides the value for the failure rate of a 
circuit irrespective of the failure manifestation that impairs the circuit. In order to 
calculate the failure rate Fλ  of a particular manifestation F  of a permanent failure 
(e.g., stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1, delay, different function, etc.), we rewrite equation (3.4) 





















, λλ  (3.7) 
where 
Γ   the set of failure manifestations F  that impact the circuit,  
FH   the set of hardware failure mechanisms (e.g., HCI, EM, TDDB) that 




FjS ,   the set of segments (transistors and interconnections) stressed by 
failure mechanism j  which lead to failure manifestation F ,  
j
iλ   the constant stress failure rate of segment i  under stress j , and 
jiw ,   the duty factor for 
j
iλ .  
For example, expression Fλ  for the AND2_1 gate is as follows:  


















































































Note that parameters Γ , FH  and FjS ,  are determined as explained in Section 
3.1.2. Also, as explained in Section 3.1.2, transistors 3M , 4M  and 5M  under HCI 
and interconnection 4N  under EM can be neglected for the reliability analysis of the 
AND2_1 gate.  
To calculate duty factors jiw , , we need to use the Standardized Inputs and the 
Stress Patterns described in Section 3.1.1, the Failure Manifestations described in 
Section 3.1.2, and also a Hardware Serial Model which is described hereafter.  
The software execution on hardware devices (normally includes CPU, memory, 




model assumes that the software execution on hardware devices is divided into a 
series of demand and idle intervals, as depicted in Figure 3.15.  
Demand Idle Demand Idle Demand …… Idle
Figure 3.15 Hardware serial model during software execution 
 
Thus the software execution in terms of a specific unit constitutes a series of 
being-demanded and not-being-demanded (idle) combinations. As an example, Figure 
3.16 shows this execution process for a logic gate and a flip-flop when the 
Standardized Inputs considered in Section 3.1.1 are applied.  
D1 I I I I I I I ID2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8  
a) Demand (D) and idle (I) intervals of a logic gate 
IDID D D I DIDIDID D D IDIDID D D DIDID D DIII I I I I I I  
b) Demand (D) and idle (I) intervals of a flip-flop 




execution using the Standardized Inputs 
 
As shown in Figure 3.16, a demand interval is actually triggered by a logic 
change of any of the input signals to the hardware device. We assume that the 
duration of a demand interval is equivalent to the duration of a transition period of a 
signal. Such a duration is symbolized by τ .  
As stated above, coefficients jiw ,  can be calculated using the Hardware Serial 
Model described above in combination with the Standardized Inputs, the Stress 
Patterns and the Failure Manifestations. This is illustrated for the AND2_1 gate in 





Figure 3.17 Stress patterns using the Standardized Inputs 
 
As shown in Figure 3.17, the different current peaks of the stress patterns for the 
HCI and EM effects can be matched to a particular demand transition of the hardware 
serial model. For instance, transistor 0M  is stressed by HCI only during demand 6D , 
and such a stress will lead to the Delay-rise failure manifestation. Then, coefficient 
hciw ,0  can be calculated as T
d τ6 , where T  is the duration of the time window within 
which the measurement is being performed, τ  is the duration of a demand transition 
iD , and 6d  is the number of demands of type 6D  that occurred within time window 
T  (e.g., in Figure 3.17, id  is equal to 1 for all i ). On the other hand, the different 
voltage pulses of the stress patterns for the TDDB effect can be matched to a 
particular logic combination of the input signals. For instance, transistor 0M  is 
stressed by TDDB only for logic combination 11 of the input signals, and such a 
stress will lead to a stuck-at-0 failure manifestation. Then, coefficient tddbw ,0  can be 
calculated as 
T
t11 , where 11t  is the duration of logic combination 11 (e.g., in Figure 
3.17, ijt  is equal to 4
T  for all ji, ). 
In general, duty factor jiw ,  is given by the following expression:  
( ) { }




































T   the duration of the time window where the measurement is being 
performed, 
( )jiI ,   the set of sub-indexes y  of those demand transition types yD  for 
which stress j  impacts segment i  (e.g., ( ) { }7,6,3,2,3 =emI ),  
kd   the number of demands of type kD  that occurred within time window 
T , 
τ   the duration of a demand transition,  
( )jiC ,   the set of logic combinations of the input signals for which stress i  
impacts segment j  (e.g., ( ) { }10,01,00,2 =tddbC ), and 
ct   the duration of logic combination c  of the input signals within time 
window T .  
Note that the value of parameters kd , ct  and T  is software dependent. In other 
words, the execution of different software applications will lead to different values 
for kd , ct  and T .  
For example, using equations (3.8) and (3.9), expressions riseDelay−λ  and 
0−−atStuckλ  for the AND2_1 gate are as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )
























































































































































In equation (3.11), we assume that in the same circuit element all the 
nMOSFETs have the same channel width nW , and all the pMOSFETs have identical 
channel width pW . From equation (2.3) and (3.3) we can see that the same type of 
MOSFET transistors have the same failure rate if they are put under the same 
constant voltage stress. The ratio of pMOSFET transistors failure rate to that of 



















c  (3.12) 
where 
np WW ,   channel width of pMOSFET and nMOSFET transistors, respectively 
β   Weibull slope parameter in (2.3) 
Actually, in vtvtlib25 standard cell library used for this study, not only the above 
assumption is true, but also all the cells of the same drive strength have identical 
nMOSFET and pMOSFET dimension. Therefore, the above analysis is applicable to 
other gates in the cell library. Based on this analysis, in (3.11), the failure rate of 
nMOSFETs due to TDDB is denoted as tddbλ , and the failure rate of pMOSFETs is 




In practice, the measurement of parameters kd  and ct  might make the 
calculation of the usage profile (i.e., last step of the methodology in Figure 3.1) 
complex and time consuming. We thus propose an alternative simplified version for 
expression jiw , , as described hereafter: 
( ) { }
























T   the duration of the time window where the measurement is being 
performed, 
( )jiI ,   the number of transition types xD  for which stress j  impacts segment 
i  (e.g., ( ) { } 47,6,3,2,3 ==emI ),  
I   the total number of demand transition types (e.g., in general, for a n-
asynchronous input signal circuit, I  is equal to nn2 ),  
d   the number of demand transitions of any type, ∑∀= i idd , that 
occurred during time window T  (e.g., in Figure 3.17, d  is equal to 8),  
τ   the duration of a demand transition jD ,  
( )jiC ,   the number of logic combinations of the input signals for which stress 
j  impacts segment i  (e.g., ( ) { } 310,01,00,2 ==tddbC ),  
C   the total number of logic combinations of the input signals (e.g., in 




Equation (3.13) is simplified since only parameters d  and T  are software 
dependent, and the measurement of parameter d  is easier in practice than the 
measurement of kd  and ct  from equation (3.9).  
Using equation (3.13), expression (3.10) for riseDelay−λ  and (3.11) for 0−−atStuckλ  


























0 +=++=−−  (3.15) 
 
In expressions (3.14) and (3.15), only parameter d  needs to be measured for the 
calculation of the usage profile. 
The failure rates (both the detailed and simplified version) for the other failure 
manifestations of the AND2_1 gate can be calculated in a similar way using Figure 
3.17 and equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.13). These models are provided in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Failure rate models of the AND2_1 gate per failure manifestation 
  Detailed models Simplified models 




























































































2 ++  tddbc λ
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2 ++  tddbc λ
4























2++  tddbcλ  
 Fλ  Failure rate of the circuit for failure manifestation F  
 j
iλ  Failure rate of segment i  due to stress j  
 tddbλ  Failure rate due to TDDB stress 
 id  Number of demands of type jD  that occurred within time 




 d  Number of demand transitions of any type occurred during time 
window T . 
 c  Relation between the TDDB failure rate of nMOSFET and 
pMOSFET transistors.  
 τ  Duration of a demand transition iD . 
 T  Duration of the time window where the measurement is 
performed. 
 11100100 ,,, tttt
 
Durations of logic combinations 00, 01, 10, 11 of the input 
signals within time window T . 
 
3.3 Calculation of Failure Probabilities 
3.3.1 Calculation of the Hardware Usage Profile 
This section describes step 4 of Figure 3.1.  
As discussed in Section 3.1, a device failure probability over time depends on 
the number of times the unit is demanded. For digital devices, especially a CPU, the 
way in which each unit is accessed depends heavily on the set of instructions 
(collectively called the software) it executes. Using the tools Synopsys VCS MX [61] 
and Synopsys Design Analyzer [62] makes it feasible to simulate the software 
execution against the hardware device’s VHDL script.  
Synopsys VCS MX is the industry’s most comprehensive RTL verification 
solution in a single product, providing advanced bug-finding technologies, a built-in 




verification languages including Verilog, VHDL, SystemVerilog and SystemC. 
Synopsys VCS MX provides a high-performance, high-capacity full language VHDL 
simulator. It is used to analyze, compile, and simulate design descriptions written in 
IEEE VHDL 1076-1993 [63], and provides a set of VHDL simulation and debugging 
features to validate the VHDL design descriptions. These features provide capabilities 
for source level debugging and simulation result viewing. The tool supports all levels 
of design descriptions but is optimized for the behavioral and register-transfer levels.  
Synopsys Design Analyzer is a powerful analysis tool that provides synthesis 
control, design management, and design analysis in a graphical environment. With 
Synopsys Design Analyzer the user can perform various design set-up and analysis 
functions, as well as view and interact with the synthesized schematic. 
The procedure to obtain the hardware usage profile of the circuit elements is 























for counting demands Extended
VHDL code 
(GATE level)
Figure 3.18 Description of the VHDL simulation step of the methodology 
 
First, the functionality of the VHDL RTL script that describes the hardware 




between them) is verified by means of the Synopsys VCS MX simulator. The VHDL 
RTL script is then ready to be translated into an actual gate level netlist using 
Synopsys Design Analyzer. The process of converting the RTL description into a 
netlist for a given target technology is called logic synthesis. To produce the 
synthesized netlist, the synthesis tool requires the RTL code of the hardware devices 
and the cell libraries. The cell libraries provide information about all the available 
cells, including connectivity and functionality, timing, area, and corresponding 
symbol, among others. Some extra VHDL code is then inserted into the gate level 
VHDL scripts which will count the number of demands to the circuit elements (e.g., 
gates, flip-flops) during the VHDL simulation. On the other hand, the application 
software needs to be compiled into machine code. This code will be loaded into the 
system memory during the VHDL simulation. The gate level’s VHDL scripts and the 
machine code are thus used by the Synopsys VCS MX simulator to simulate the 
execution of the application software on the computer system. The outcome of this 
simulation will consist of the software-specific hardware usage profile in terms of 
number of demands issued to the circuit elements under study.  
An example of such a profile is provided in Figure 3.19. The “Circuit elements” 
axis represents a set of circuit elements under analysis. The “Time” axis defines the 
execution time of the system under a given software application (i.e., parameter T  of 
Section 3.2), and the “Demands” axis provides the number of demands of each circuit 





















Figure 3.19 Software-specific hardware usage profile – an example 
 
The number of demands of a circuit element will systematically increase 
monotonically over time. However, the speed of the increase will differ for different 
circuit elements and software applications [64].  
3.3.2 Calculation of the Hardware Failure Probability Distributions 
This section describes step 5 of Figure 3.1.  
The software-specific hardware failure probability Fip  of a circuit element i  





i λλ ≈−= −1  (3.16) 
where 
F
iλ   the failure rate of failure manifestation 
F
iλ  of circuit element 
F
iλ  
(equivalent to equation (3.7)), 





A hardware device of a computer system is composed of a set of circuit elements. 
For example, a register consists of a series of register bits (or flip-flops), and an ALU 
is composed of a netlist of logic gates. Therefore, the software-specific hardware 
failure probability distribution (or profile) FiP  under failure manifestation F  of a 
hardware device i  composed of n  circuit elements is as follows: 





F pp ,...,1   the failure probabilities of circuit elements n,...,2,1  under 
failure manifestation F  (equivalent to equation (3.16)). 
Finally, the combined software-specific hardware failure probability distribution 





















F pp ,...,1   the failure probabilities of circuit elements n,...,2,1  under 
failure manifestation F  (equivalent to equation (3.16)), 
nΓΓΓ ,...,, 21  the sets of all failure manifestations F  of circuit elements 
n,...,2,1  
An example of the combined software-specific hardware failure probability 
profile over time is provided in Figure 3.20. The “Hardware device” axis contains the 




the execution time of the system under a given software application (i.e., parameter 
T  of equation (3.16)), and the Z-axis provides the software-specific hardware failure 
probability of each circuit element of the hardware device under any failure 
manifestation (i.e., parameter ∑
Γ∈ 1F
F


























Figure 3.20 Combined software-specific hardware failure probability profile – an 
example 
 
As in the case of the number of demands (see Figure 3.19), the failure 
probability of each circuit element of a hardware device will increase monotonically 





Chapter 4 Calculation of Failure Probabilities 
The methodology developed in Chapter 3 has been applied to an example system. 
The microprocessor considered in this system is the Zilog Z80 CPU, a CPU whose 
VHDL description was publicly available. There are no theoretical barriers to extend 
the proposed approach to other CPUs and devices such as memory or busses as long 
as their VHDL scripts are available.  
4.1 System Description 
The example system is configured as shown in Figure 4.1. The system consists 
of a Zilog Z80 microprocessor, and a RAM module. A set of control signals plus the 
data and address busses are also included to constitute a minimum system. The Z80 
CPU is the pilot processor we used to demonstrate the methodology. The RAM 
module is used to store software program in machine code format. 
 
 





The Zilog Z80 microprocessor has been designed and manufactured by Zilog 
since 1976. It was widely used both in desktop and embedded computer designs and 
is one of the most popular CPUs of all time. Z80 was the heart of many computers 
like Spectrum, Partner, TRS703, Z-3. The Z80 microprocessor is an 8-bit CPU with a 
16-bit address bus capable of direct access to 64k of memory space. The Z80 CPU 
can execute 158 different instructions.  
The Z80 CPU contains 208 bits of read/write memory that are available to the 
programmer. The registers include two sets of six pairs of general-purpose registers 
(B, C, D, E, H, L, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, Hp, Lp) that may be used individually as 8-bit 
registers or in pairs as 16-bit registers. There are also two sets of accumulator and flag 
registers and six special-purpose registers. The special-purpose registers include 
Program Counter (PC), Stack Pointer (SP), Index Registers (IX and IY), Interrupt 
Page Address Register (I), and Memory Refresh Register (R). The other important but 
nonprogrammable register is the Instruction Register (IR) [65]. 
The Z80 VHDL script used in the case study was obtained from the T80 project 
at opencores.org [66]. The T80 is a configurable CPU core that supports Z80, 8080 
and Gameboy instruction sets. The original T80 VHDL code is written in RTL level. 
The VHDL code is tailored to support the Z80 microprocessor instruction set only. 
Besides the 22 user-programmable registers described above, the Z80 VHDL 
model has another 31 hidden registers, including the Instruction Register (IR), which 
are not visible to the programmer. The hidden registers are used by the CPU to store 




Then the RTL level code is synthesized to logic gate level through Synopsys 
Design Analyzer using the vtvtlib25 standard cell library [58, 59]. The gate level 
netlist consists of about 5000 logic gates and flip-flops. The total number of 
transistors is on the order of 30000. The number of metal interconnects is in the 
neighborhood of 40000. 
The gate level VHDL script is further modified to fit the simulation requirements. 
For example, as shown in Figure 4.2, the four new signals n2543, n2544, n2545, 
n2546 are introduced for the purpose of counting the number of demands for the logic 
gate U1250, which is of type ab_or_c_or_d.  
architecture SYN_rtl of Z80_ALU is 
-- original signal in the Z80 ALU gate level VHDL code 
      signal n2543, n2544, n2545, n2546, …: std_logic;  
   … 
begin 
   ALU_n2543 <= n2543; 
   ALU_n2544 <= n2544; 
   ALU_n2545 <= n2545; 
   ALU_n2546 <= n2546; 
-- ALU_n2543, ALU_n2543, ALU_n2543, ALU_n2543 are probes introduced to 
monitor the n2543, n2544, n2545, n2546 signals, which are connected to the inputs 
of gate ab_or_c_or_d. 
   … 




=> n2546, op => Q(0)); 
   … 
end SYN_rtl; 
Figure 4.2 Modified Z80 CPU script segment 
 
4.2 Analysis of Failure Manifestations 
The failure manifestations of different circuit elements, including D flip-flop 
used as CPU register bits and all the logic gates used by the ALU of the Z80 CPU are 
analyzed.  
4.2.1 Analysis of the CPU Register Bits 
The logic synthesis result indicates that D flip-flops from the vtvtlib25 standard 
cell library is used to represent the register bits of the Z80 CPU. The layout of the D 
flip-flop is shown in Figure 4.3. The corresponding schematic with input stimuli is 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. 
 






Figure 4.4 Circuit schematic for D flip-flop 
 
The operation of the D flip-flop under a standardized input stimulus is shown in 
Figure 4.5, where the value of the output signal Op  will be updated with the value of 





Figure 4.5 Transient response under normal operation 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the results of the SPICE simulations performed on the D flip-flop to 
study its failure manifestations. The X-axis contains the different segments of the 
flip-flop ( ,...2,1,...2,1 NNMM ). For HCI and EM (Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b), the 
Y-axis represents the percentage of demand transitions of a segment either with 




the flip-flop ( ( ) clkclk IjiI /, ). For TDDB (Figure 4.6c), it is shown instead the 
percentage of logic combinations of the asynchronous input signal under which the 
TDDB effect impacts a segment ( ( ) CjiC , ). On the top of each column, we have 
included the failure manifestation observed for a segment (using the “detailed 
manifestation” notation). When nothing is indicated, it means that the failure of a 

































































































































































































































































































































c) TDDB stress 
Figure 4.6 Z80 registers bits – Results of SPICE simulations. 
 
The information provided by the SPICE simulations allows us to build the 
failure rate models of the flip-flop for each failure manifestation. Let’s first focus on 
Figure 4.6a. The only failure manifestation observed at the circuit level is stuck-at-1, 
due to the failure of transistors 16M  and 26M  under the HCI effect. Using equations 
(3.7) and (3.13)  and the demand percentages on Figure 4.6a, the failure rate for 







+=−− .  
However, this expression is incomplete since we still need to include the 
contributions to the stuck-at-1 failure rate from the other failure mechanisms. In 
Figure 4.6b, the failure of interconnections 1N , 6N , 12N , 16N , 18N  and 19N  
under EM lead to stuck-at-1. Consequently, the contribution of the EM effect to the 

















3 . Finally, according to Figure 4.6c, the 
stuck-at-1 failure manifestation under TDDB stress is provoked by nMOS transistors 
5M , 16M  and 26M  (for a time percentage equivalent to 23 ) and pMOS 
transistors 1M , 6M , 8M , 10M , 12M , 17M , 19M  and 23M  (for a time 
percentage equivalent to 431 ). The contribution of the TDDB stress to the stuck-at-1 
failure rate is tddbc λ
4
136 + . Combining these three partial results, the final expression 
for the stuck-at-1 failure rate of the flip-flop is as follows:  



























⎛ +++++++=−−  (4.1) 
 
The stuck-at-0 failure rate can be calculated in a similar way (see Table 4.1). 
Also, as shown in Figure 4.6b, transistors 8M  and 14M  lead to the delay-rise and 
delay-fall manifestations, respectively. The corresponding failure rates are given by 
expressions Td emriseDelay 8τλλ =
−  and Td emfallDelay 14τλλ =
− .  
The reliability models for the flip-flop are summarized in Table 4.1 using the 
“simplified manifestation” notation.  
Table 4.1 Reliability models for the flip-flop circuit element of the Z80 CPU 
 
[ ]1,0−Delayλ  0−−atStuckλ  1−−atStuckλ  
( )
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4.2.2 Analysis of Fault Models for Combinational Logic Elements 
 
In Z80 CPU, all the arithmetic and logical instructions are executed in the 
Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU). The logic synthesis results indicate that ALU is 
composed of pure combinational logic gates. There are no registers used in the ALU. 
In this work, all the combinational logic gates in the ALU are analyzed. The analysis 
can be extended to other combinational logic circuits of the microprocessor. 
The logic synthesis results show that the ALU contains 461 logic gates of 
different types. These types are listed in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Different type of logic gates used in the ALU of the Z80 CPU 
 
 # of Input Signals Logic function 
INV_1 1 a  
NOR2_1 2 ba +  
OR2_1 2 ba +  
NAND2_1 2 ab  
AND2_1 2 ab  
XOR2_1 2 baba +  
XNOR2_1 2 baba +  
ABorC 3 cab +  
MUX2_1 3 acba +  
NOR3_1 3 cba ++  
NAND3_1 3 abc  
NAND4_1 4 abcd  
NOR4_1 4 dcba +++  
OR4_1 4 dcba +++  
ABorCorD 4 dcab ++  
NOT (ABorCorD) 4 dcab ++  
 
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 illustrate the standardized input signal stimuli used for the 
3- and 4-inputs gates. The signal stimulus for the 2-inputs gates appears in Figure 3.6. 





Figure 4.7 Standardized input signal stimuli for 3-inputs gates 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Standardized input signal stimuli for 4-inputs gates 
 
The reliability models for the logic gates are developed in a similar way as 
explained in 3.2 for the AND2_1 gate. The results of the SPICE simulations for the 
logic gates are provided in Appendix A. 
A total of 120 different types of failure manifestations have been observed for 
the ALU gates (see Appendix A):  
66 types correspond to delays of the transitions of the output signal triggered at 
specific combinations of the inputs. From them, 32 impact the falling transitions of 




51 types correspond to behavioral changes of the gates leading to different logic 
functions.  
Two types correspond to the stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 manifestation types.  
In order to cover all these different types of failure manifestations, we have 
developed more than 250 reliability models for the ALU gates. Using the “simplified 
manifestation” notation, it is possible to combine them and reduce these figures to 90 
models for 19 manifestation types (namely, 1−Delay , 17.0−Delay , 25.0−Delay , 33.0−Delay , 
38.0−Delay , 4.0−Delay , 5.0−Delay , 6.0−Delay , 67.0−Delay , 75.0−Delay , 0−− atStuck , 1−− atStuck , 
06.0−DiffFunc , 13.0−DiffFunc , 19.0−DiffFunc , 25.0−DiffFunc , 38.0−DiffFunc , 5.0−DiffFunc , 63.0−DiffFunc ). 
Further, we have merged the various types of delays and different functions into a 
single category. It leads to 49 models for four manifestation types, as shown in Table 
4.3.  
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4.3 Lifetime Model Parameters Calculation 
In order to calculate the failure rates of the reliability models developed in the 
previous section, we need to obtain all the lifetime model parameters, especially the 
model prefactors for all three failure mechanisms. 
The parameters in the lifetime models of different failure mechanisms are 
estimated from accelerated testing experiments. For example, for the EM failure 
mechanism, the current density exponent and thermal activation energy in equation 
(2.2) can be estimated by testing the metal interconnect at different current and 
temperature level, respectively. These parameter values usually remain unchanged at 




However, the lifetime model prefactors will depend on the quality control and 
the material properties. Even though they can also be obtained from accelerated 
testing, the actual value varies from one foundry to another. The values of the 
prefactors are set by each semiconductor foundry to keep the lifetime of 
semiconductor devices within a specific reliability target. A general assumption is 
that the foundry will do their best to make sure there is no dominating failure 
mechanism, which indicates that the failure rates for different mechanisms are 
roughly the same. Without conducting device life testing, we can estimate the model 
prefactors from the above assumption. 
The reliability target for a semiconductor chip is usually about 30 years [60], 
which translates to a FIT value of around 3,800. This FIT value is for the device 
nominal operating conditions, which means the device is operating under dynamic 
stress conditions. With the assumption of no dominant failure mechanism, the FIT 
value is evenly distributed for the three failure mechanisms, which means each failure 
mechanism has a FIT value of about 1,300.  
The lifetime model prefactors of all three failure mechanisms can be calculated 
based on the above conditions for the case of the Z80 microprocessor. The results of 
logic synthesis with the vtvtlib25 standard cell library show that the total number of 
logic gates and flip-flops is on the order of 5,000. The total number of transistors is 
about 30,000. The number of metal interconnects is in the neighborhood of 40,000. 




4.3.1 TDDB Lifetime Model Prefactor  
Based on the above assumption, the total failure rate for the TDDB mechanism 
is 
16103.11300 −−×== hrFITTDDBλ  
From the standard inputs pattern simulation, the average duty factor for the 
TDDB effect is about 0.5, which means that a transistor is stressed by the TDDB 
mechanism about 50% of the time during circuit operation. However, in the TDDB 
lifetime model, the failure rate is calculated assuming the gate oxide is stressed 
constantly. Therefore, the failure rate we should use in the lifetime model is the 
failure rate at operating condition divided by the average duty factor. The adjusted 




= 2.6 ×10−6 hr−1 
The total lifetime for TDDB is 
t f '(TDDB) =
1
λ'TDDB
= 3.85 ×105 hr  
The channel length of a MOSFET in the vtvtlib25 cell library is 240nm. The 
channel width of a nMOSFET is 840nm, while the pMOSFET channel width is 
1680nm. The average area of the gate oxide of a MOSFET is the average of a 
nMOSFET and pMOSFET gate area. 
AMOSFET = 240 ×
840 +1680
2




At nominal operating conditions, with the typical value β =1.64 , a = −78 , 
b = 0.081, c = 8.81×103, and d = −7.75 ×105  in the lifetime model [51], the model 
prefactor is 
ATDDB =























= 6.06 ×1014  
4.3.2 HCI Lifetime Model Prefactor  
With the same assumptions as before, the total failure rate for the HCI effect is 
λHCI =1.3×10
−6 hr−1 
The average duty factor for HCI effect is about 0.01. Based on an analysis 
similar to the one conducted for the TDDB failure rate, the adjusted total failure rate 




=1.3 ×10−4 hr−1  
The total lifetime for HCI is 
t f '(HCI) =
1
λ'HCI
= 7.69 ×103 hr  
The nMOSFET transistor channel width is 
W = 8.4 ×10−7 m  
The average substrate current is about 
AIsub
8107.1 −×=  
With the typical value of 5.1=n  and eVEaHCI 15.0−= in the lifetime model [51], 
























4.3.3 EM Lifetime Model Prefactor  
The total failure rate for the EM effect is 
λEM =1.3×10
−6 hr−1 
The average duty factor for the EM mechanism is about 0.03 as observed from 




= 4.33 ×10−5 hr−1 
The total lifetime for EM is 
t f '(EM) =
1
λ'EM
= 2.31×104 hr  
The interconnect cross section area is 
2131088.2 mA −×=   
The average value of current flow in the interconnect is 
I = 6.5 ×10−5 A 
With the typical value of 2=n  and eVEaEM 8.0= in the lifetime model [51], 
The EM lifetime model prefactor is 
AEM =



















With the actual values of the lifetime model prefactors, the failure rates for all 





4.4 Usage and Failure Probability Distribution Profiles 
The calculation of the hardware failure probability of hardware components 
using the reliability models developed in Section 4.2 requires hardware usage 
information for the software under consideration. Once the usage profile is obtained, 
we can build the hardware failure probability distribution profile, which can be used 
to study the software reliability induced by hardware failures. 
The software code used here is a 32-bit floating point division program that does 
the division of two single precision floating point numbers and returns the quotient 
also as a single precision floating point number. Division is the most complicated 
operation compared with other elemental operations, such as addition, subtraction and 
multiplication. Since Z80 is an 8-bit CPU, a 32-bit floating point division operation is 
quite complex to implement on this microprocessor. The software code is first written 
in C language and compiled into Z80 assembly code using SDCC compiler, which is 
a retargettable, optimizing ANSI - C compiler that targets the Intel 8051, Maxim 
80DS390 and the Zilog Z80 based MCUs [67]. The assembly program contains 968 
lines of code. 
Figure 4.9 shows the usage profile of the registers of the Z80 CPU at the end of the 
execution of the floating point division program with a particular operational profile 
used. The X axis denotes the index of all the Z80 registers, including the user 
programmable registers and the hidden ones. The indexes of all the user 
programmable registers are listed in Table 4.4. The hidden registers are indexed from 
23 to 53. The Y axis denotes the indexes of register bits in the registers. The number 





Table 4.4 Index of user programmable registers 
 
Name ACC Ap F Fp B Bp C Cp D Dp E 
Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Name Ep H Hp L Lp I R IX IY SP PC 































Figure 4.9 Usage profile for all the CPU registers for the division software program 
 
We can see that the usage varies for different registers. Some of them are used 
quite frequently, while there are several registers not used at all during software 
execution. Some of the hidden register bits have higher demand than the user 
programmable ones. The usage of different register bits within a particular register 




randomly distributed. But for the registers storing address information, for example 
the program counter (PC) register, the lower bits are used more often than the higher 
bits. 
Quantitatively, the total number of demands to the registers at the end of the 
software execution is about 200000. Out of the 53 registers, 8 registers (e.g., PC, R) 
are demanded within [31000, 10001], 11 registers (e.g., F, ACC, L, SP, H) within 
[10000, 1001], 9 registers (e.g., E, C, B, D) within [1000, 101], 3 registers (e.g., IX, 
IY) within [100, 1], and 22 registers (e.g., Ap, Fp, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, Hp, Lp, I) are not 
used. The coefficients of variation (i.e. the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) 
for the usage of different register bits within the registers are also calculated. The user 
programmable registers with the highest coefficients of variation are SP (2.17) and 
PC (1.92), and the lowest are E (0.08), and H (0.01).  
Figure 4.10 shows the failure probability distributions of the registers of the Z80 
CPU at the end of the execution of the division application with the particular 






























a) Delay failure manifestation. 
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b) Stuck-at failure manifestation. 






The software-specific hardware failure profile of the Z80 registers for the delay 
manifestation is shown in Figure 4.10a. The total delay probability of all registers at 
the end of the software execution is about 9E-12. Out of the 53 registers, 2 registers 
(all hidden registers) have probability within [2E-12, 1E-12], 14 registers (e.g., PC, R, 
F, ACC) within [10E-13, 1E-13], 10 registers (e.g., L, SP, H, E, C, B) within [10E-14, 
1E-14], 3 registers (e.g., D, IX) within [10E-15, 1E-15], 2 registers (e.g., IY) within 
[10E-16, 1E-16], and 22 registers (e.g., Ap, Fp, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, Hp, Lp, I) are not 
affected. The user programmable registers with the highest coefficients of variation of 
delay probability are SP (2.17) and PC (1.92), and the lowest are E (0.08), H (0.01). 
The software-specific hardware failure profile of the Z80 registers for the stuck-
at manifestation is shown in Figure 4.10b. The total stuck-at probability of all 
registers at the end of the software execution is about 1E-08. Out of the 53 registers, 
32 registers (including all the user programmable registers in the following order: PC, 
SP, IX, IY, R, F, ACC, L, H, E, C, B, Ap, Fp, Bp, Cp, Dp, Ep, Hp, Lp, I, D) have 
failure probability within [7E-10, 1E-10], and the other 21 registers (all hidden) 
within [10E-11, 3E-11]. The user programmable registers with the highest 
coefficients of variation of stuck-at probability are PC (0.37) and R (0.34), and the 
lowest are registers Lp (1.48E-08) and I (1.48E-08).  
As can be seen, the results for the delay manifestations follow the same pattern 
as the number of demands (Figure 4.9). This means the delay failure probability is 
highly dependent on the hardware usage induced by the software execution. On the 
contrary, the stuck-at failure probability is always positive even when the register bits 




by the TDDB effect, and the latter is stressing the semiconductor devices even when 
the device is under static usage conditions (as explain in Section 3.1.1). 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the combined failure probability distribution profile of the Z80 
CPU registers. The failure profile is similar to the stuck-at failure profile in Figure 
4.10b, since the stuck-at manifestation is dominant over the delay manifestation by a 
difference of several orders of magnitude. 
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Figure 4.11 Combined failure probability distribution for all the registers for the 
division software program 
 
Figure 4.12 shows the usage information of the ALU gates of the Z80 CPU for the 
division application software. All the gates are included in a possible ALU layout in 
the 2-D map. We use a gray scale to indicate usage information: the deeper the colors 
in the map, the higher the number of demands during the software execution. It can 




The total number of demands for all the gates is about 4E10. Out of the 461 
logic gates, 128 are demanded within [6E4, 1E4], 294 gates within [10E3, 1E3], 27 
gates within [10E2, 1E2], and 12 are not demanded. Per type, the most demanded 
gate types are mux2_1 and nor2_1 with the number of demands within [75000, 
80000], and the less demanded are or2_1 and or4_1 (less than 30,000). For the gates 
of the same type, the highest demand variance is experimented by types nor4_1 and 
inv_1, while the lowest variance is experienced by nand2_1 and xnor2_1 (with 
coefficients of variation of 1.45, 1.02, 0.42 and 0.06, respectively). Per individual 
gates of the same type, the gates with the maximum number of demands are of type 
nor4_1 (with one gate with 55,681 demands) and mux2_1 (with one gate with 45,271 
demands), and the minimum number of demands are of type ABorC, inv_1, nor2_1 
and or2_1 (with at least one gate with 0 demand). The highest demand average are 
observed in gates of type or4_1 (15,460 demands) and not_ab_or_c_or_d (15,454 






Figure 4.12 ALU usage map for the division software program 
 
Figure 4.13 shows the failure probability information for the ALU gates of the Z80 
CPU after one run of the division application software.  
 





b) Different-Function failure manifestation. 
 
c) Stuck-at failure manifestation. 
Figure 4.13 ALU map of probability distributions of different failure 





The software-specific hardware failure profile of the Z80 ALU gates for the 
delay manifestation is shown in Figure 4.13a. The total delay failure probability of 
the ALU gates at the end of the software execution is 2.6E-09. Out of the 461 gates, 
86 have probabilities within [8E-11, 1E-11], 92 gates within [10E-12, 1E-12], 247 
gates within [10E-13, 1E-13], 24 gates within [10E-14, 1E-14], and 12 are not 
affected. Per gate type, the highest failure probability types are mux2_1 (1.33E-09) 
and xor_1 (5.55E-10), and the lowest are of type or2_1 (3.45E-12) and nor4_1 
(2.10E-12). Among the gates of a same type, the highest probability variance is 
experienced by gates of type nor4_1 and inv_1, while the lowest variance is 
experienced by nand2_1 and xnor2_1 gates (with coefficient variations of 1.45, 1.02, 
0.42 and 0.06, respectively). Per individual gates within a type, the gates with the 
maximum failure probability are of type mux2_1 (with one gate with probability 
7.6E-11) and xnor2_1 (with one gate with probability 7.3E-11), and gates with the 
minimum failure probability are of type ABorC, inv_1 nor2_1, and or2_1 (with at 
least one gate with 0 probability). The highest probability averages are observed in 
gates of type xnor2_1 (6.97E-11) and xor2_1 (2.13E-11), while the lowest in types 
nand2_1 (2.74E-13) and nor4_1 (2.10E-13).  
The failure probability profile of the Z80 ALU gates for the different function 
manifestation is displayed in Figure 4.13b. The total failure probability of the 
different function manifestation of the ALU gates at the end of the software execution 
is 1.12E-09. Of all the gates in the ALU, 2 gates have probabilities within [1E-11, 2E-
11], 312 gates within [10E-12, 1E-12], 70 gates within [10E-13, 9E-13], 77 gates (the 




xor2_1 (2.36E-10) and nor2_1 (1.99E-10), and the lowest are or4_1 (2.99E-12) and 
inv_1 (0). Among the gates of the same type, the highest probability variance is 
experienced by gates of type nor2_1 and nand2_1 (with coefficients of variation of 
8.07E-08, 2.93E-08), while the lowest variance is experienced by gates of type 
ab_or_c_or_d, mux2_1, nor3_1, nor4_1, or2_1, xnor2_1 and xor2_1 (0 variation 
coefficient). Per individual gates of the same type, the gates with the maximum 
failure probability are of type xnor2_1 (with one gate with probability 1.8E-11) and 
xor2_1 (with one gate with probability 9.1E-12), and the minimum are types inv_1 
(with at least one gate with 0 probability). The highest probability averages are 
observed in gates of type xnor2_1 (1.78E-11) and xor2_1 (9.09E-12), while the 
lowest in types nor2_1 (1.50E-12) and mux2_1 (9.46E-13).  
The failure probability profile for all the gates in the ALU for the stuck-at 
manifestation is shown in Figure 4.13c. The total stuck-at failure probability of all the 
ALU gates at the end of the software execution is 7.65E-10. Out of the 461 gates, 417 
have probabilities within [4.5E-12, 1E-12], while 44 gates (of types 
not_ab_or_c_or_d and xor2_1) are not affected. Per gate type, the highest failure 
probability types are nor2_1 (2.28E-10) and inv_1 (1.46E-10), and the lowest are 
or4_1 (2.99E-12) and not_ab_or_c_or_d and xor2_1 (0). Within the gates of a same 
type, the highest probability variance is experienced by gates of type nor2_1, 
ab_or_c_or_d, nor4_1 and nand2_1 (with coefficients of variation within [8.53E-08 
1.46E-08], while the lowest variance is experienced by gate type ABorC, and2_1, 
inv_1, mux2_1, nand3_1, nand4_1, nor3_1, or2_1 and xnor2_1 (0 variation). Per 




of type or4_1 (with one gate with probability 4.40E-12) and or2_1 (with one gate 
with probability 3.80E-12), and gates with the minimum probability are types 
not_ab_or_c_or_d and xor2_1 (with at least one gate with 0 probability). The highest 
probability averages are observed in gates of type or4_1 (4.37E-12) and or2_1 
(3.79E-12), while the less in types nand3_1 (1.31E-12) and nand2_1 (1.15E-12).  
Figure 4.14 shows the combined failure probability distribution of the ALU gates of 
the Z80 CPU for the division application software (i.e., Delay+DiffFunc+Stuck-at in 
Figure 4.13).  
 
Figure 4.14 ALU map of combined failure probability distribution for the 
division program 
 
The total failure probability of all the ALU gates at the end of the software 
execution is 4.48E-09. Out of the 461 gates, 115 gates have probabilities within [10E-
11, 1E-11], and 346 gates within [10E-12, 1E-12]. Per gate type, the highest failure 




or2_1 (2.46E-11) and or4_1 (1.35E-11). For the gates of the same type, the highest 
probability variance is experienced by gates of type mux2_1 and xor2_1, while the 
lowest variance is experienced by gates of type xnor2_1 and nand2_1 (with 
coefficient variations of 0.82, 0.48, 0.05 and 0.03, respectively). Per individual gates 
of the same type, the gates with the maximum failure probability are of type xnor2_1 
(with one gate with probability 9.2E-11) and mux2_1 (with one gate with probability 
7.8E-11), and the minimum are of types nor2_1 (with one gate with probability 3E-12) 
and inv_1 (with at least one gate with probability 2E-12). The highest probability 
averages are observed in gates of type xnor2_1 (8.94E-11) and xor2_1 (3.04E-11), 
while the lowest occur in types nor2_1 (3.70E-12) and inv_1 (2.73E-12).  
The hardware failure probability distributions discussed before is based on the 
execution of the division software program with a particular set of input values. The 
probability distribution profile is not constant for different software programs. Figure 
4.15 shows the ALU gates usage map for a 16-bit bubble sorting software program. 
The program sorts an array of integer numbers in descending order. The assembly 
language program contains 342 lines of code. The corresponding failure probability 






Figure 4.15 ALU usage map for the bubble sorting program 
 
 






By comparing the ALU gate usage map of the bubble sorting program to that of 
the division program (Figure 4.12), we can see that the maximum number of demands 
is higher in the division program. The usage distributions for all the gates are 
different as shown in the difference of gray areas on the usage map. However, there 
are also similarities between the two maps. The most frequently demanded gates are 
located roughly in the same spots, which means that even though these are two 
different software programs, the most demanded hardware components are almost the 
same. Similar conclusions can be made for the comparison of the failure probability 
distribution maps of the two programs (Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.16).  
This information is useful for both software and hardware reliability engineers, 
especially when working on developing embedded systems, where the software 
programs used are more or less fixed. For software reliability engineers, they should 
put more emphasis on studying the hardware components with high failure 
probabilities during the execution of the software program, rather than assuming that 
all the hardware components have the same probability of failure. For hardware 
reliability engineers, they should work with the hardware designer to decrease the 
failure probability of failure by making proper adjustments for the highly stressed 
hardware components. This will be the most efficient way to increase both the 
hardware reliability and the reliability of the software running on the hardware device. 
The effects of different software input values and different compilers on the 
hardware failure probability distribution are also analyzed in [68]. The analyses 
indicate that while different inputs may yield slightly different failure probability 




could also lead to different failure distributions. Compilers that tend to use more 





Chapter 5 Transient Failures and Models 
 
The impact of hardware failures on software reliability is discussed in detail in 
the previous three chapters, where only permanent failures are considered. However, 
for some systems, such as those used for space applications, transient failures caused 
by external radiation become an important factor, which could impact the reliability 
of the system. In this chapter, transient failures from different sources of radiation are 
studied. Then the case study used in Chapter 4 is extended to consider the transient 
failure probability distributions of the same hardware devices in a satellite application 
environment. 
5.1 Transient Failures 
5.1.1 Transient Failure Introduction 
Transient failures, also called soft errors or Single Event Upsets (SEUs) [69], 
appear in semiconductor devices during system operation due to electrical noise (e.g., 
noisy power supply) or external radiation such as α-particles, cosmic rays or nuclear 
reactions. SEUs mainly consist of the generation of electron-hole pairs due to the 
collision of energetic particles with the silicon atoms, which in turn can lead to 
temporal voltage and current peaks in the circuit. So, contrary to permanent failures, 
SEUs do not introduce physical defects in the circuit.  
Electrical noise may come from well-known sources such as a noisy power 
supply or radiation from lightning. Extensive design efforts have been made during 




The α-particles are emitted by radioactive impurities (e.g., uranium) present in 
packaging materials and the interconnect wires of integrated circuits [70]. Nowadays, 
the SEU rate induced by α-particles can be drastically reduced by the use of highly 
purified materials (e.g., α-particle emission from chip metallization can be reduced 
by a factor of approximately 1000 by using a highly purified aluminum with an 
impurity concentration of the order of 2ppb [71]).  
Cosmic rays are the main the source of radiation in deep space leading to SEUs 
in microelectronic devices, in particular due to proton and heavy ion particles [72]. 
Within the earth’s atmosphere the major causes of SEUs are the neutron particles 
from spallation reactions occurring when the galactic cosmic rays collide with the 
oxygen and nitrogen atoms in the air. At sea level, about 97% percent of the 
remaining cosmic ray particles are neutrons. Neutrons are expected to cause upsets in 
microelectronic devices within 18km in the atmosphere. Energetic protons are also 
abundant in the near-Earth Van Allen belts.  
Nuclear reactions (e.g., from spacecrafts or nuclear power-plant reactors) also 
lead to an important emission of neutrons [72]. In particular, in future nuclear-
powered space missions from NASA, neutrons induced from space nuclear reactors 
will have an important impact on the reliability of microelectronic devices used in the 
spacecraft.  
5.1.2 Impact on Higher Hardware Levels  
SEUs mainly manifest themselves in the form of pulses in combinational logic (a 
temporal peak of current or voltage in a signal) and bit-flips in storage elements (the 




permanent failures, SEUs in combinational logic are less likely to propagate to the 
storage elements due to a set of well-known masking mechanisms (i.e., logical 
masking, electrical masking and latching-window masking [73]).  
Therefore, this chapter focuses on investigating the impact of SEUs on hardware 
storage elements, such as flip-flops. The failure rates of bit-flips from different 
radiation sources are introduced in the following section. 
5.2 Failure Rate Calculation 
5.2.1 Heavy Ions Induced SEUs  
Due to their high Linear Energy Transfer (LET) values, heavy ions can cause 
direct ionization when passing through microelectronic devices and leading to SEUs. 
The LET corresponds to the amount of energy lost by the radiation particles per unit 
of distance traveled, which is deposited into the device. The fundamental assumption 
of the upset mechanism is that there is a Sensitive Volume (SV) within a 
semiconductor device that can be upset by the passage of the radiation particles. The 
SV is thus independent from the radiation particles considered. The SV is generally 
modeled as a right Rectangular Parallelepiped (RPP) shape with lateral dimensions x 
and y and thickness z. Associated with the SV is a Cross Section (CS) that can be 
interpreted as the projection of the SV in the direction of the movement of the 
radiation particles.  
The data needed to calculate the heavy ions induced failure rate is shown in 
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Figure 5.1 Heavy ions SEU rate calculation 
 
According to Figure 5.1, three different types of data are necessary to calculate 
the heavy ions induced failure rate:  
 Data dependent upon the design and technology of the IC storage elements 
(z, Lo, W, S, CSm),  
 Data dependent upon the operational space environment of the spacecraft  
(Relements, EM),  
 Data dependent upon the particular characteristics of the mission and the 
spacecraft design (θshielding, O).  
The physical meaning of each parameter is described as follows: 
 IC sensitive volume thickness (z) is the thickness of the Sensitive Volume 
(SV).  
 IC cross section fitting parameters (Lo, W, S) are a set of values used to 
approximate the Cross Section (CS) curve as a function of the Linear 
Energy Transfer (LET). They correspond to the onset threshold LET (Lo), 




 IC saturation cross section (CSm) is the value that CS approaches as LET 
gets very large. It is equivalent to area xy of the SV. 
 Radiation elements range (Relements) refers to the range of radiation elements 
present in the environment (e.g., heavy ions He+2 to Ni+28).  
 Environment model (EM) corresponds to the operational environment of the 
spacecraft. It considers long-term average and worst case particle fluxes.  
 Spacecraft shielding thickness (θshielding) corresponds to the thickness of the 
spacecraft shielding.  
 Spacecraft orbit (O) corresponds to the spacecraft orbit, including Near-
Earth Interplanetary orbits (e.g., earth to mars) and orbits inside the 
magnetosphere.  
Experimental data for the (saturation) cross section (CS, CSm) and the fitting 
parameters (Lo, W, S) are available from on-ground based radiation tests. These tests 
are performed by subjecting the device to radiation particles of a range of LETs. The 
sensitive volume thickness (z) is given by the semiconductor technology 
specifications. The radiation elements range (Relements), environmental model (EM), 
spacecraft shielding thickness (θshielding) and orbit (O) can be determined from the 
spacecraft and mission specifications.  
The analytical modeling for the heavy ions induced failure rate is shown in 
Figure 5.2, and is based on the IRPP model [74-76]. The model has been 
implemented by CREME96 program [77, 78]. CREME96 (Cosmic Ray Effects on 




Laboratory. It has become a widely used design tool in the aerospace industry for 
SEU rate calculation. 
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E, ∫dE Variable E is the threshold energy for generating a device critical 
charge, whose integration range is provided by the CREME96 
FLUX module. 
flux Heavy ions flux spectra outside of the spacecraft, calculated using 
the CREME96 FLUX module. 
Φ(L) Integral flux over ion LET for the environment of concern, 
calculated using the CREME96 TRANS module. 
Ap Average projected area of the right rectangular parallelepiped 
shaped sensitive volume. 
f(s) Distribution of path lengths through the sensitive volume. 
R(E) The upset rate for a particular threshold energy.  
F(L) The integral Weibull distribution describing the shape of the CS 
versus LET curve.  
L Threshold LET 





Figure 5.2 Analytical modeling for heavy ions induced failure rate 
 
5.2.2 Protons Induced SEUs 
The basic physics of the upset interaction for protons is the same as for heavy 
ions. Both types of upsets are caused by the ionization of a device after it collects 
charge produced by the ionization of a passing radiation particle. The difference is 
that heavy ions can produce SEUs directly due to the high LET values, while proton 
upsets are caused by the ionization of secondary particles produced by a nuclear 
reaction in the vicinity of the sensitive volume. 
The data needed to calculate the protons induced failure rate is shown in Figure 
5.3.  
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Figure 5.3 Protons SEU rate calculation 
 
The environment model (EM), the spacecraft shielding thickness (θshielding), the 
spacecraft orbit (O), and the saturation cross section (CSm) are defined in Section 
5.2.1. Parameters A, B, Eo, W, S are used to adjust the cross section curve. The 
analytical modeling for the proton induced failure rate is shown in Figure 5.4, and is 
































































1)(σEo, W, S, CSm
 
E, ∫dE Variable E is the proton energy, whose integration range is provided 
by the CREME96 FLUX module. 
σ(E) Proton cross section as a function of proton energy. 
J(E) Differential proton flux at the sensitive volume. 
Figure 5.4 Analytical modeling for protons induced failure rate 
 
5.2.3 Neutrons Induced SEUs 
Similar to the protons induced SEUs, neutron upsets are caused by the ionization 
of secondary particles produced by a nuclear reaction around the sensitive volume. 
We distinguish between the upset rate caused by neutrons present in the earth’s 
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Figure 5.5 Atmospheric neutron SEU rate calculation 
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Figure 5.6 Spacecraft nuclear reactor neutron SEU rate calculation 
 
The concept of IC sensitive volume (parameter V) has already been described in 
Section 5.2.1. Parameter X is the value of the neutron-induced error (NIE) as a 
function of the device critical charge [80]. F is the integral flux of neutrons present in 
the atmosphere with energy above 1MeV. Regarding spacecraft nuclear reactors, Fs 
represents the neutron flux emitted by the reactor, Dst is the distance between the 
reactor and the target semiconductor devices, Mshielding is the shielding material of the 




Letaw and Normand calculated the neutron-induced error (NIE) as a function of 
the device critical charge for different environments [80]. They proposed a simple 
analytical model for the neutron induced SEU rate as the product of parameters F, V 
and X, as shown in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8.  




Figure 5.7 Analytical modeling for atmospheric neutrons induced failure rate 
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Figure 5.8 Analytical modeling for spacecraft nuclear reactor neutrons induced 
failure rate 
 
Value F for the neutron flux depends on the environment. For atmospheric 
neutrons (Figure 5.7), a typical neutron flux above 1 MeV is 1cm-2s-1. For nuclear 
reactor induced neutrons, the neutron flux at the surface of the microelectronic 
devices F is inversely proportional to the square of the distance to the neutron source 
Dst. The flux value can also be reduced by the shielding material. The effectiveness of 
the shielding should be obtained through radiation testing.  For example, the neutron 
flux can be reduced by 1 magnitude with LiH shielding of 7.8cm thickness [81]. 
Therefore, the final flux value F can be calculated as a function of Fs, Mshielding, 




5.3 Extension of Permanent Failure Probability Results 
With the information on transient failures above, the study of the hardware 
failure probability distribution can be extended to include the case for transient 
failures. We now consider the computer system described in the last chapter is used in 
a satellite application. The orbit considered here is a Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) 
with an inclination of 27 degrees around the earth (with an apogee of 35449 km and 
perigee of 3997 km). The period of the orbit is 11 hr 39 min. The environment model 
corresponds to a solar quiet condition with long-term average SEU rates. Assume the 
shielding thickness for the satellite is 100 mils (which equals to 0.25cm). The range 
of radiation elements includes all possible heavy ions (atomic number from 2 to 92) 
and protons. We assume that a nuclear reactor will not be used for the satellite orbit, 
which means there will be no neutron in this orbit environment. 
To calculate the SEU rates for different radiation sources, the parameters in 
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4 have to be obtained. The environment and mission orbit 
related parameters can be chosen based on the above description. The IC storage 
elements related parameters should be extracted from radiation testing. Since we do 
not have such testing data available for the flip-flops in the vtvtlib25 cell library, the 
radiation testing data of similar technology is used, assuming they have similar SEU 
rates. Ground based radiation tests have been performed on the registers of the 
PPC750 microprocessor by IBM and Motorola [82], The PPC750 microprocessor is 
also based on the CMOS 0.25μm technology. The Weibull fitting parameters are 
extracted from the test data of the PPC750 registers. All the parameters needed are 




Table 5.1 Parameters for the calculation of SEU rates for the HEO orbit profile 
 
Parameters Heavy ions Protons 
z 2μm  
Lo 3.6 MeV-cm2/mg  
W 30.82 MeV-cm2/mg 88.98 MeV 
S 0.92 0.95 
CSm 10 μm2 0.1×10-12 cm2 
Relements atomic number 2 to 
92 
 
EM long-term average fluxes 
θshielding 100 mils 
O Highly Elliptical Orbit 
Eo  8.0 MeV 
 
The average SEU rates induced by heavy ions and protons for each orbit 
segment are calculated and illustrated in Figure 5.9. The Y axis denotes the SEU rate 
in the unit of SEUs/Bit/Hour. The X axis denotes the time along an orbit period. The 





































Figure 5.9 Heavy ions and protons induced SEU rates along the HEO orbit as a 





























Figure 5.10 Total SEU rates along the HEO orbit as a function of time 
 
High SEU rates appear when the satellite is close to Earth, where trapped 
protons are mainly responsible for the transient failures. When the satellite is far from 




Figure 5.11 shows a comparison of transient and permanent failure probabilities for 
several register bits along the orbiting period, assuming the CPU is executing the 
division program described in Section 4.4 repetitively. The transient failure 
probability increases rapidly during the time when the satellite is close to Earth due to 
the high SEU rates. On the other hand, the permanent failure probabilities increase in 
a stable style regardless of the satellite’s possition. In this case, the SEU is the 




































Figure 5.11 Transient and permanent failure probabilities along the orbit as a 
function of time 
 
However, the transient SEU rate can be reduced through radiation hardening 
techniques. Ground-based tests show that the SEU rate of a radiation hardened 
microprocessor, such as the RAD750 developed by BAE system based on the 
PPC750 microprocessor, can be reduced by up to six orders of magnitude [83, 84]. If 
the registers in the Z80 microprocessor are hardened using such techniques, the SEU 




magnitude, the probabilities for transient and permanent failures along the satellite 
orbit would be of the same order, as illustrated in Figure 5.12. If this is the case, both 




































Figure 5.12 Transient and permanent failure probabilities along the orbit as a 




Chapter 6 Summary and Future Research 
 
6.1 Summary 
In this dissertation, we have developed a methodology for the reliability analysis 
of the manifestations of permanent hardware failures in the hardware devices of 
computer systems operating under a particular execution profile of application 
software. An analysis of the different types of manifestations of permanent failure in  
semiconductor devices was performed at different hardware levels (physical, logic 
and register transfer levels). We have focused on intrinsic failures (HCI, EM, TDDB), 
which propagate to higher hardware levels in the form of signal delays, changes of 
circuit functionality, and signals stuck at a logic value (0 or 1). We then proposed a 
methodology for the analysis of the manifestations of permanent hardware failures on 
software reliability. The methodology is divided into three parts: (i) analysis of the 
manifestations of permanent failures on circuit elements (logic gates, flip-flops, etc.), 
(ii) development of reliability models as functions of the software execution, and (iii) 
calculation of failure probability distributions of the hardware devices of a computer 
system under a particular software execution. 
In the first part of this methodology (analysis of failure manifestations), SPICE 
simulation is performed to investigate the behavior of the circuit elements (logic gates 
and flip-flops) under study with a set of generic input stimuli, which covers all 
possible combinations of logic levels and transitions of the input signals. This allows 
for calculating the failure rates of different circuit elements. A set of Failure 




TDDB is used to study the circuit failure manifestations in the presence of hardware 
failures. The main outcome of this phase consists of the set of manifestations of the 
permanent failures observed in the circuits’ output signals (e.g., signal delays, 
functionality changes or stuck-at failures). 
In the second part of the methodology (development of reliability models), a set 
of reliability models are built that allow for calculating the occurrence rate of each 
failure manifestation of a circuit as a function of the software execution profile of a 
computer system. The models are based not only on existing expressions for the 
constant stress failure rate of permanent failures, but also on specifically developed 
models that account for the operational conditions of circuits (e.g., current and 
voltages) and for the usage of the computer hardware devices as a consequence of the 
software execution. Different structures and notations are proposed for the reliability 
models in order to process huge numbers of failure manifestations into reduced and 
practical sets of expressions. 
In the third part of the methodology (calculation of failure probability 
distributions) the reliability models developed in the previous phase are applied to a 
particular computer platform. The usage of the hardware devices is obtained through 
VHDL simulations of the computer system under the execution of the software 
program of interest. This allows for solving the reliability models and calculating the 
failure probability distributions (per failure manifestation) of the various hardware 
devices of the computer platform (e.g., ALU gates, CPU registers, memories, etc.).  
We have then extended the methodology to the consideration of transient 




manifestations of transient failures in semiconductor devices, and developed 
reliability models that integrate into the same framework well-known analytical 
models for the failure rate calculation of Single Event Upsets (SEUs). These take into 
account SEUs induced by cosmic ray particles (heavy ions and protons), neutrons 
present in the atmosphere, as well as neutrons emitted by nuclear reactors such as the 
ones that will be used in the spacecrafts of the future nuclear powered space missions 
from NASA. The models use design and technology parameters of the IC hardware 
devices, the operational environment characteristics (radiation particle fluxes) as well 
as the specifications of the system and mission (e.g., spacecraft shielding and orbit). 
The case study was then extended to the consideration of transient failures, by 
calculating the failure probability distributions due to SEUs of the hardware devices 
of the Z80 based computer system.  
6.2 Conclusions 
The contribution of this dissertation is to propose a simulation-based method to 
determine the software-specific hardware usage profile and failure probability profile 
that can be used to determine the likelihood, location, and the time of hardware 
failures in computer systems in operation. The main features and contributions of the  
methodology are summarized hereafter: 
 It takes into account the influence of the software execution, the operational 
environment and the semiconductor design and technology in the creation 
and activation phenomena of hardware failures. 
 It includes the whole spectrum of hardware failures that can arise during the 




permanent semiconductor defects due to Hot Carrier Injection, 
Electromigration, and Time Dependent Dielectric Breakdown.  
 It considers all the possible locations for the hardware failures, i.e. not only 
sequential logic circuits (registers, memory cells, caches, etc.) but also 
combinational logic circuits (logic gates). 
 It analyzes the propagation of failures under particular operational 
conditions (including the software execution) and precisely determines the 
form under which each hardware failure manifests (stuck-at-1, stuck-at-0, 
bit-flip, circuit delay, change of functionality, etc.). 
 It takes into account the usage of the hardware circuit elements due to the 
software execution during the operational life of the system and provides the 
failure probability distributions of the circuit elements. This information can 
facilitate both software and hardware reliability engineers to improve the 
system reliability more efficiently by focusing on the most failure-prone 
circuit elements.  
 It can be used to extend the use of the fault injection technique to software 
reliability prediction under hardware failures and allows for precisely 
defining representative fault models that can be used in fault injection 
techniques and tools. It also sets the basis to develop testbeds based on 
software implemented fault injection (SWIFI) to calculate the final failure 
probability of the software application. As far as we know, this is the first 




6.3 Future Work 
We have focused on permanent and transient failures that directly impact the 
storage elements and logic gates in a computer system. One of the future directions of 
this work will be to extend the approach to account for the impact of permanent and 
transient failures that propagate from combinational logic circuit elements of a 
microprocessor to its storage elements. We also plan to extend the proposed 
reliability models to account for the effect of the hardware detection and recovery 
mechanisms (e.g., error detection and correction codes) used in most modern 
computer systems. Finally, the results of this research will be integrated into PRA 
frameworks and will be used for the calculation by fault injection of the software 




Appendix A Failure Manifestations for Logic Gates 
 
Table A.1 Z80 ALU logic gates – Results of SPICE simulations for HCI stress  
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Table A.2 Z80 ALU logic gates – Results of SPICE simulations for EM stress  
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Table A.3 Z80 ALU logic gates – Results of SPICE simulations for TDDB stress 
 





1−− atStuck  









bDiffFunc →  
aDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  













bDiffFunc →  
aDiffFunc →  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  









1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
bDiffFunc →  

























baDiffFunc →  
abDiffFunc →  
abDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc →  
abDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc →  













cbDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  
0−− atStuck  
caDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  





























cabacbaDiffFunc ++→  
bcacDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc →  
cbaDiffFunc ++→  
cbaDiffFunc →  
cbaDiffFunc ++→  
cbaDiffFunc →  
caDiffFunc +→  
acDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  

















bccaDiffFunc +→  
cbDiffFunc +→  
caDiffFunc +→  
cDiffFunc →  
cbaDiffFunc ++→  
abDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  













1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
bcDiffFunc →  
acDiffFunc →  





























baDiffFunc +→  
abDiffFunc →  
abDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
baDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
abDiffFunc →  
baDiffFunc +→  
abDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  











1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  











acdDiffFunc →  
abdDiffFunc →  

















dcbDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  
0−− atStuck  
dcaDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  
dbaDiffFunc →  
0−− atStuck  





















dcbDiffFunc ++→  
1−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
dcaDiffFunc ++→  
1−− atStuck  
dbaDiffFunc ++→  
1−− atStuck  
cbaDiffFunc ++→  
0−− atStuck  



















dcDiffFunc →  
dcbDiffFunc →  
dcaDiffFunc →  
( ) dcdcbaDiffFunc ++→  
dcbaDiffFunc →  
dbdaDiffFunc +→  
dcbaDiffFunc →  





















dcDiffFunc +→  
dcbDiffFunc ++→  
dcaDiffFunc ++→  
( )( ) cddcbaDiffFunc +++→  
dcbaDiffFunc +++→  
( )( )dbdaDiffFunc ++→  
dcbaDiffFunc +++→  
( )( )cbcaDiffFunc ++→  
0−− atStuck  













0−− atStuck  
0−− atStuck  
1−− atStuck  
bDiffFunc −  
aDiffFunc −  





ALU  Arithmetic Logic Unit 
CS  Cross Section 
EM  Electromigration 
EOS  Electrical Overstress 
ESD  Electrostatic Discharge 
FIT  Failure In Time 
HCI  Hot Carrier Injection 
HEO  Highly Elliptical Orbit 
HISREM Hot Carrier Induced Series Resistance Enhancement Model 
IC  Integrated Circuit 
IRPP  Integral Rectangular Parallelpiped 
LET  Linear Energy Transfer 
MaCRO Maryland Circuit Reliability-Oriented SPICE simulation method 
MOSFET  Metal-Oxide Semiconductor Field-Effect Transistor 
MTTF  Mean Time To Failure 
RTL  Register Transfer Level 
RPP  Rectangular Parallelpiped 
SOFR  Sum-of-failure-rates 
SPICE  Simulation Program Integrated Circuits Emphasis 
SV  Sensitive Volume 
SWIFI  Software Implemented Fault Injection 
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